diff options
author | Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2018-05-25 23:29:36 +0000 |
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committer | Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2018-05-31 15:18:32 -0700 |
commit | 8ff4f2f51a6cf07fc33742ce3bee81328896e49b (patch) | |
tree | 4a166b8389404be98a6c098babaa444e2dec8f48 /patches/source/shadow | |
parent | 76fc4757ac91ac7947a01fb7b53dddf9a78a01d1 (diff) | |
download | current-14.1.tar.gz current-14.1.tar.xz |
Fri May 25 23:29:36 UTC 201814.1
patches/packages/glibc-zoneinfo-2018e-noarch-2_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt.
Handle removal of US/Pacific-New timezone. If we see that the machine is
using this, it will be automatically switched to US/Pacific.
Diffstat (limited to 'patches/source/shadow')
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/adduser | 445 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/doinst.sh | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/login.defs | 389 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/patches/README_PATCHES | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/patches/unused/r3299.diff | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff | 35 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | patches/source/shadow/shadow.SlackBuild | 175 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/shadow.glibc217-crypt.diff | 258 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/shadow.url | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/slack-desc | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/shadow/useradd | 8 |
11 files changed, 1369 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/adduser b/patches/source/shadow/adduser new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce06aac54 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/adduser @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Copyright 1995 Hrvoje Dogan, Croatia. +# Copyright 2002-2004, 2008, 2009, 2010 Stuart Winter, Surrey, England, UK. +# Copyright 2004, 2008-2010 Slackware Linux, Inc., Concord, CA, USA +# Copyright 2012 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is +# permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of this script must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO +# EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +# PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; +# OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +# WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR +# OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF +# ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +# +# +########################################################################## +# Program: /usr/sbin/adduser +# Purpose: Interactive front end to /usr/sbin/useradd for Slackware Linux +# Author : Stuart Winter <mozes@slackware.com> +# Based on the original Slackware adduser by Hrvoje Dogan +# with modifications by Patrick Volkerding +# Version: 1.15 +########################################################################## +# Usage..: adduser [<new_user_name>] +########################################################################## +# History # +########### +# v1.15 - 2012-09-13 +# * Added scanner group, which may be required by third party drivers. +# v1.14 - 2012-08-24 +# * Added lp group, which is now required for scanning. <pjv> +# v1.13 - 13/01/10 +# * Fixed bug that removed underscore characters from UNIX group names. +# Thanks to mRgOBLIN for the report and Jim Hawkins for the fix. <sw> +# v1.12 - 21/07/09 +# * Adjusted the search of /etc/passwd to exclude the NIS inclusion +# string. Thanks to Dominik L. Borkowski. +# v1.11 - 04/06/09 +# * Add power and netdev to the suggested group list +# v1.10 - 24/03/08 +# * To facilitate use of the automatic mounting features of HAL, +# allow the admin to easily add users to the default groups: +# audio,cdrom,video,plugdev,floppy. +# The default is not to add new users to these groups. +# And by the way, this script is "useradd from Slackware" not +# "superadduser from Gentoo" ;-) +# v1.09 - 07/06/04 +# * Added standard Slackware script licence to the head of this file. +# v1.08 - 25/04/04 +# * Disallow user names that begin with a numeric because useradd +# (from shadow v4.03) does not allow them. <sw> +# v1.07 - 07/03/03 +# * When supplying a null string for the uid (meaning 'Choose next available'), +# if there were file names in the range 'a-z' in the pwd then the +# egrep command considered these files rather than the null string. +# The egrep expression is now in quotes. +# Reported & fixed by Vadim O. Ustiansky <sw> +# v1.06 - 31/03/03 +# * Ask to chown user.group the home directory if it already exists. +# This helps reduce later confusion when adding users whose home dir +# already exists (mounted partition for example) and is owned +# by a user other than the user to which the directory is being +# assigned as home. Default is not to chown. +# Brought to my attention by mRgOBLIN. <sw> +# v1.05 - 04/01/03 +# * Advise & prevent users from creating logins with '.' characters +# in the user name. <sw> +# * Made pending account creation info look neater <sw> +# v1.04 - 09/06/02 +# * Catered for shadow-4.0.3's 'useradd' binary that no longer +# will let you create a user that has any uppercase chars in it +# This was reported on the userlocal.org forums +# by 'xcp' - thanks. <sw,pjv> +# v1.03 - 20/05/02 +# * Support 'broken' (null lines in) /etc/passwd and +# /etc/group files <sw> +# * For recycling UIDs (default still 'off'), we now look in +# /etc/login.defs for the UID_MIN value and use it +# If not found then default to 1000 <sw> +# v1.02 - 10/04/02 +# * Fix user-specified UID bug. <pjv> +# v1.01 - 23/03/02 +# * Match Slackware indenting style, simplify. <pjv> +# v1.00 - 22/03/02 +# * Created +####################################################################### + +# Path to files +pfile=/etc/passwd +gfile=/etc/group +sfile=/etc/shells + +# Paths to binaries +useradd=/usr/sbin/useradd +chfn=/usr/bin/chfn +passwd=/usr/bin/passwd +chmod=/bin/chmod + +# Defaults +defhome=/home +defshell=/bin/bash +defchmod=711 # home dir permissions - may be preferable to use 701, however. +defgroup=users +AGID="audio cdrom floppy plugdev video power netdev lp scanner" # additional groups for desktop users + +# Determine what the minimum UID is (for UID recycling) +# (we ignore it if it's not at the beginning of the line (i.e. commented out with #)) +export recycleUIDMIN="$(grep ^UID_MIN /etc/login.defs | awk '{print $2}' 2>/dev/null)" +# If we couldn't find it, set it to the default of 1000 +if [ -z "$recycleUIDMIN" ]; then + export recycleUIDMIN=1000 # this is the default from Slackware's /etc/login.defs +fi + + +# This setting enables the 'recycling' of older unused UIDs. +# When you userdel a user, it removes it from passwd and shadow but it will +# never get used again unless you specify it expliticly -- useradd (appears to) just +# look at the last line in passwd and increment the uid. I like the idea of +# recycling uids but you may have very good reasons not to (old forgotten +# confidential files still on the system could then be owned by this new user). +# We'll set this to no because this is what the original adduser shell script +# did and it's what users expect. +recycleuids=no + +# Function to read keyboard input. +# bash1 is broken (even ash will take read -ep!), so we work around +# it (even though bash1 is no longer supported on Slackware). +function get_input() { + local output + if [ "`echo $BASH_VERSION | cut -b1`" = "1" ]; then + echo -n "${1} " >&2 # fudge for use with bash v1 + read output + else # this should work with any other /bin/sh + read -ep "${1} " output + fi + echo $output +} + +# Function to display the account info +function display () { + local goose + goose="$(echo $2 | cut -d ' ' -f 2-)" # lop off the prefixed argument useradd needs + echo -n "$1 " + # If it's null then display the 'other' information + if [ -z "$goose" -a ! -z "$3" ]; then + echo "$3" + else + echo "$goose" + fi +} + +# Function to check whether groups exist in the /etc/group file +function check_group () { + local got_error group + if [ ! -z "$@" ]; then + for group in $@ ; do + local uid_not_named="" uid_not_num="" + grep -v "$^" $gfile | awk -F: '{print $1}' | grep "^${group}$" >/dev/null 2>&1 || uid_not_named=yes + grep -v "$^" $gfile | awk -F: '{print $3}' | grep "^${group}$" >/dev/null 2>&1 || uid_not_num=yes + if [ ! -z "$uid_not_named" -a ! -z "$uid_not_num" ]; then + echo "- Group '$group' does not exist" + got_error=yes + fi + done + fi + # Return exit code of 1 if at least one of the groups didn't exist + if [ ! -z "$got_error" ]; then + return 1 + fi +} + +#: Read the login name for the new user :# +# +# Remember that most Mail Transfer Agents are case independant, so having +# 'uSer' and 'user' may cause confusion/things to break. Because of this, +# useradd from shadow-4.0.3 no longer accepts usernames containing uppercase, +# and we must reject them, too. + +# Set the login variable to the command line param +echo +LOGIN="$1" +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z $needinput ]; do + if [ -z "$LOGIN" ]; then + while [ -z "$LOGIN" ]; do LOGIN="$(get_input "Login name for new user []:")" ; done + fi + grep "^${LOGIN}:" $pfile >/dev/null 2>&1 # ensure it's not already used + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "- User '$LOGIN' already exists; please choose another" + unset LOGIN + elif [ ! -z "$( echo $LOGIN | grep "^[0-9]" )" ]; then + echo "- User names cannot begin with a number; please choose another" + unset LOGIN + elif [ ! "$LOGIN" = "`echo $LOGIN | tr A-Z a-z`" ]; then # useradd does not allow uppercase + echo "- User '$LOGIN' contains illegal characters (uppercase); please choose another" + unset LOGIN + elif [ ! -z "$( echo $LOGIN | grep '\.' )" ]; then + echo "- User '$LOGIN' contains illegal characters (period/dot); please choose another" + unset LOGIN + else + unset needinput + fi +done + +# Display the user name passed from the shell if it hasn't changed +if [ "$1" = "$LOGIN" ]; then + echo "Login name for new user: $LOGIN" +fi + +#: Get the UID for the user & ensure it's not already in use :# +# +# Whilst we _can_ allow users with identical UIDs, it's not a 'good thing' because +# when you change password for the uid, it finds the first match in /etc/passwd +# which isn't necessarily the correct user +# +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + _UID="$(get_input "User ID ('UID') [ defaults to next available ]:")" + egrep -v "^$|^\+" $pfile | awk -F: '{print $3}' | grep "^${_UID}$" >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "- That UID is already in use; please choose another" + elif [ ! -z "$(echo $_UID | egrep '[A-Za-z]')" ]; then + echo "- UIDs are numerics only" + else + unset needinput + fi +done +# If we were given a UID, then syntax up the variable to pass to useradd +if [ ! -z "$_UID" ]; then + U_ID="-u ${_UID}" +else + # Will we be recycling UIDs? + if [ "$recycleuids" = "yes" ]; then + U_ID="-u $(awk -F: '{uid[$3]=1} END { for (i=ENVIRON["recycleUIDMIN"];i in uid;i++);print i}' $pfile)" + fi +fi + +#: Get the initial group for the user & ensure it exists :# +# +# We check /etc/group for both the text version and the group ID number +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + GID="$(get_input "Initial group [ ${defgroup} ]:")" + check_group "$GID" + if [ $? -gt 0 ]; then + echo "- Please choose another" + else + unset needinput + fi +done +# Syntax the variable ready for useradd +if [ -z "$GID" ]; then + GID="-g ${defgroup}" +else + GID="-g ${GID}" +fi + +#: Get additional groups for the user :# +# +echo "Additional UNIX groups:" +echo +echo "Users can belong to additional UNIX groups on the system." +echo "For local users using graphical desktop login managers such" +echo "as XDM/KDM, users may need to be members of additional groups" +echo "to access the full functionality of removable media devices." +echo +echo "* Security implications *" +echo "Please be aware that by adding users to additional groups may" +echo "potentially give access to the removable media of other users." +echo +echo "If you are creating a new user for remote shell access only," +echo "users do not need to belong to any additional groups as standard," +echo "so you may press ENTER at the next prompt." +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + history -c + history -s "$AGID" + echo "Press ENTER to continue without adding any additional groups" + echo "Or press the UP arrow key to add/select/edit additional groups" + AGID="$(get_input ": " | sed 's/[^A-Za-z0-9 _]//g;s/ */ /g;s/^ $//g' )" + if [ ! -z "$AGID" ]; then + check_group "$AGID" # check all groups at once (treated as N # of params) + if [ $? -gt 0 ]; then + echo "- Please re-enter the group(s)" + echo + else + unset needinput # we found all groups specified + AGID="-G $(echo $AGID | tr ' ' ,)" # useradd takes comma delimited groups + fi + else + unset needinput # we don't *have* to have additional groups + fi +done + +#: Get the new user's home dir :# +# +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + HME="$(get_input "Home directory [ ${defhome}/${LOGIN} ]")" + if [ -z "$HME" ]; then + HME="${defhome}/${LOGIN}" + fi + # Warn the user if the home dir already exists + if [ -d "$HME" ]; then + echo "- Warning: '$HME' already exists !" + getyn="$(get_input " Do you wish to change the home directory path ? (Y/n) ")" + if [ "$(echo $getyn | grep -i "n")" ]; then + unset needinput + # You're most likely going to only do this if you have the dir *mounted* for this user's $HOME + getyn="$(get_input " Do you want to chown $LOGIN.$( echo $GID | awk '{print $2}') $HME ? (y/N) ")" + if [ "$(echo $getyn | grep -i "y")" ]; then + CHOWNHOMEDIR=$HME # set this to the home directory + fi + fi + else + unset needinput + fi +done +HME="-d ${HME}" + +#: Get the new user's shell :# +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + unset got_error + SHL="$(get_input "Shell [ ${defshell} ]")" + if [ -z "$SHL" ]; then + SHL="${defshell}" + fi + # Warn the user if the shell doesn't exist in /etc/shells or as a file + if [ -z "$(grep "^${SHL}$" $sfile)" ]; then + echo "- Warning: ${SHL} is not in ${sfile} (potential problem using FTP)" + got_error=yes + fi + if [ ! -f "$SHL" ]; then + echo "- Warning: ${SHL} does not exist as a file" + got_error=yes + fi + if [ ! -z "$got_error" ]; then + getyn="$(get_input " Do you wish to change the shell ? (Y/n) ")" + if [ "$(echo $getyn | grep -i "n")" ]; then + unset needinput + fi + else + unset needinput + fi +done +SHL="-s ${SHL}" + +#: Get the expiry date :# +echo +needinput=yes +while [ ! -z "$needinput" ]; do + EXP="$(get_input "Expiry date (YYYY-MM-DD) []:")" + if [ ! -z "$EXP" ]; then + # Check to see whether the expiry date is in the valid format + if [ -z "$(echo "$EXP" | grep "^[[:digit:]]\{4\}[-]\?[[:digit:]]\{2\}[-]\?[[:digit:]]\{2\}$")" ]; then + echo "- That is not a valid expiration date" + else + unset needinput + EXP="-e ${EXP}" + fi + else + unset needinput + fi +done + +# Display the info about the new impending account +echo +echo "New account will be created as follows:" +echo +echo "---------------------------------------" +display "Login name.......: " "$LOGIN" +display "UID..............: " "$_UID" "[ Next available ]" +display "Initial group....: " "$GID" +display "Additional groups: " "$AGID" "[ None ]" +display "Home directory...: " "$HME" +display "Shell............: " "$SHL" +display "Expiry date......: " "$EXP" "[ Never ]" +echo + +echo "This is it... if you want to bail out, hit Control-C. Otherwise, press" +echo "ENTER to go ahead and make the account." +read junk + +echo +echo "Creating new account..." +echo +echo + +# Add the account to the system +CMD="$useradd "$HME" -m "$EXP" "$U_ID" "$GID" "$AGID" "$SHL" "$LOGIN"" +$CMD + +if [ $? -gt 0 ]; then + echo "- Error running useradd command -- account not created!" + echo "(cmd: $CMD)" + exit 1 +fi + +# chown the home dir ? We can only do this once the useradd has +# completed otherwise the user name doesn't exist. +if [ ! -z "${CHOWNHOMEDIR}" ]; then + chown "$LOGIN"."$( echo $GID | awk '{print $2}')" "${CHOWNHOMEDIR}" +fi + +# Set the finger information +$chfn "$LOGIN" +if [ $? -gt 0 ]; then + echo "- Warning: an error occurred while setting finger information" +fi + +# Set a password +$passwd "$LOGIN" +if [ $? -gt 0 ]; then + echo "* WARNING: An error occured while setting the password for" + echo " this account. Please manually investigate this *" + exit 1 +fi + +# If it was created (it should have been!), set the permissions for that user's dir +HME="$(echo "$HME" | awk '{print $2}')" # We have to remove the -g prefix +if [ -d "$HME" ]; then + $chmod $defchmod "$HME" +fi + +echo +echo +echo "Account setup complete." +exit 0 diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/doinst.sh b/patches/source/shadow/doinst.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88fefb3af --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/doinst.sh @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +config() { + NEW="$1" + OLD="$(dirname $NEW)/$(basename $NEW .new)" + # If there's no config file by that name, mv it over: + if [ ! -r $OLD ]; then + mv $NEW $OLD + elif [ "$(cat $OLD | md5sum)" = "$(cat $NEW | md5sum)" ]; then # toss the redundant copy + rm $NEW + fi + # Otherwise, we leave the .new copy for the admin to consider... +} + +config etc/login.access.new +config etc/login.defs.new +config var/log/faillog.new +rm -f var/log/faillog.new + diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/login.defs b/patches/source/shadow/login.defs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e52f91a53 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/login.defs @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +# +# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the shadow package. +# +# $Id: login.defs 3038 2009-07-23 20:41:35Z nekral-guest $ +# + +# +# Delay in seconds before being allowed another attempt after a login failure +# +FAIL_DELAY 3 + +# +# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info. +# +FAILLOG_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded. +# +LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB no + +# +# Enable logging of successful logins +# +LOG_OK_LOGINS no + +# +# Enable logging and display of /var/log/lastlog login time info. +# +LASTLOG_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable checking and display of mailbox status upon login. +# +# Disable if the shell startup files already check for mail +# ("mailx -e" or equivalent). +# +MAIL_CHECK_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable additional checks upon password changes. +# +OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable checking of time restrictions specified in /etc/porttime. +# +PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable setting of ulimit, umask, and niceness from passwd gecos field. +# +QUOTAS_ENAB yes + +# +# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging. +# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg. +# +SYSLOG_SU_ENAB yes +SYSLOG_SG_ENAB yes + +# +# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or +# a ":" delimited list of device names. Root logins will be allowed only +# upon these devices. +# +CONSOLE /etc/securetty +#CONSOLE console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04 + +# +# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file. +# +#SULOG_FILE /var/log/sulog + +# +# If defined, ":" delimited list of "message of the day" files to +# be displayed upon login. +# +MOTD_FILE /etc/motd +#MOTD_FILE /etc/motd:/usr/lib/news/news-motd + +# +# If defined, this file will be output before each login prompt. +# +#ISSUE_FILE /etc/issue + +# +# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter. +# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100 tty01". +# +#TTYTYPE_FILE /etc/ttytype + +# +# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format. +# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so... +# +FTMP_FILE /var/log/btmp + +# +# If defined, name of file whose presence which will inhibit non-root +# logins. The contents of this file should be a message indicating +# why logins are inhibited. +# +NOLOGINS_FILE /etc/nologin + +# +# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -". For +# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the +# command is "-su". If not defined, then "ps" would display the +# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh". +# +SU_NAME su + +# +# *REQUIRED* +# Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the +# home directory. If you _do_ define both, MAIL_DIR takes precedence. +# +MAIL_DIR /var/spool/mail +#MAIL_FILE .mail + +# +# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login +# sequence. If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the +# user's name or shell are found in the file. If not a full pathname, then +# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory. +# +HUSHLOGIN_FILE .hushlogin +#HUSHLOGIN_FILE /etc/hushlogins + +# +# If defined, either a TZ environment parameter spec or the +# fully-rooted pathname of a file containing such a spec. +# +#ENV_TZ TZ=CST6CDT +#ENV_TZ /etc/tzname + +# +# If defined, an HZ environment parameter spec. +# +# for Linux/x86 +ENV_HZ HZ=100 +# For Linux/Alpha... +#ENV_HZ HZ=1024 + +# +# *REQUIRED* The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users. +# +# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files) +ENV_SUPATH PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin +ENV_PATH PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin + +# +# Terminal permissions +# +# TTYGROUP Login tty will be assigned this group ownership. +# TTYPERM Login tty will be set to this permission. +# +# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group +# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and +# TTYPERM to 0620. Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign +# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600. +# +TTYGROUP tty +TTYPERM 0620 + +# +# Login configuration initializations: +# +# ERASECHAR Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace). +# KILLCHAR Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U). +# ULIMIT Default "ulimit" value. +# +# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines. +# The ULIMIT is used only if the system supports it. +# (now it works with setrlimit too; ulimit is in 512-byte units) +# +# Prefix these values with "0" to get octal, "0x" to get hexadecimal. +# +ERASECHAR 0177 +KILLCHAR 025 +#ULIMIT 2097152 + +# Default initial "umask" value. +# UMASK is also used by useradd and newusers to set the mode of new home +# directories. +# 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered +# better for privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin +# must make up her mind. +UMASK 022 + +# +# Password aging controls: +# +# PASS_MAX_DAYS Maximum number of days a password may be used. +# PASS_MIN_DAYS Minimum number of days allowed between password changes. +# PASS_MIN_LEN Minimum acceptable password length. +# PASS_WARN_AGE Number of days warning given before a password expires. +# +PASS_MAX_DAYS 99999 +PASS_MIN_DAYS 0 +PASS_MIN_LEN 5 +PASS_WARN_AGE 7 + +# +# If "yes", the user must be listed as a member of the first gid 0 group +# in /etc/group (called "root" on most Linux systems) to be able to "su" +# to uid 0 accounts. If the group doesn't exist or is empty, no one +# will be able to "su" to uid 0. +# +SU_WHEEL_ONLY no + +# +# If compiled with cracklib support, where are the dictionaries +# +#CRACKLIB_DICTPATH /var/cache/cracklib/cracklib_dict + +# +# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd +# +UID_MIN 1000 +UID_MAX 60000 +# System accounts +SYS_UID_MIN 101 +SYS_UID_MAX 999 + +# +# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd +# +GID_MIN 1000 +GID_MAX 60000 +# System accounts +SYS_GID_MIN 101 +SYS_GID_MAX 999 + +# +# Max number of login retries if password is bad +# +LOGIN_RETRIES 5 + +# +# Max time in seconds for login +# +LOGIN_TIMEOUT 60 + +# +# Maximum number of attempts to change password if rejected (too easy) +# +PASS_CHANGE_TRIES 5 + +# +# Warn about weak passwords (but still allow them) if you are root. +# +PASS_ALWAYS_WARN yes + +# +# Number of significant characters in the password for crypt(). +# Default is 8, don't change unless your crypt() is better. +# Ignored if MD5_CRYPT_ENAB set to "yes". +# +#PASS_MAX_LEN 8 + +# +# Require password before chfn/chsh can make any changes. +# +CHFN_AUTH yes + +# +# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use +# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work +# phone, home phone). If not defined, no changes are allowed. +# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh". +# +CHFN_RESTRICT frwh + +# +# Password prompt (%s will be replaced by user name). +# +# XXX - it doesn't work correctly yet, for now leave it commented out +# to use the default which is just "Password: ". +#LOGIN_STRING "%s's Password: " + +# +# Only works if compiled with MD5_CRYPT defined: +# If set to "yes", new passwords will be encrypted using the MD5-based +# algorithm compatible with the one used by recent releases of FreeBSD. +# It supports passwords of unlimited length and longer salt strings. +# Set to "no" if you need to copy encrypted passwords to other systems +# which don't understand the new algorithm. Default is "no". +# +# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD. +# +#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB no + +# +# Only works if compiled with ENCRYPTMETHOD_SELECT defined: +# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password +# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password +# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password +# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default) +# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option +# +ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA256 + +# +# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512. +# +# Define the number of SHA rounds. +# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password. +# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate +# users. +# +# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000). +# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range. +# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used. +# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used. +# +# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000 +# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000 + +# +# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set +# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE +# setting). Default is none. +# +# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent +# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console. +# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader... +# +# Most of these groups are self-explanatory, but in the case of +# "lp", it is because group lp is needed to use a scanner that +# is part of a multifunction printer. +# +# Note that users are added to these default groups only when +# logging into a shell with /bin/login, not when using a login +# manager such as kdm. In that case, users who should have +# hardware access must be added to the appropriate groups +# when the user is added with adduser or useradd, or by editing +# /etc/group directly, preferably using "vigr" +# +CONSOLE_GROUPS floppy:audio:cdrom:video:lp:scanner + +# +# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory? +# Default in no. +# +DEFAULT_HOME yes + +# +# If this file exists and is readable, login environment will be +# read from it. Every line should be in the form name=value. +# +ENVIRON_FILE /etc/environment + +# +# If defined, this command is run when removing a user. +# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by +# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument). +# +#USERDEL_CMD /usr/sbin/userdel_local + +# +# Enable setting of the umask group bits to be the same as owner bits +# (examples: 022 -> 002, 077 -> 007) for non-root users, if the uid is +# the same as gid, and username is the same as the primary group name. +# +# This also enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist. +# +USERGROUPS_ENAB yes + +# +# If set to a non-nul number, the shadow utilities will make sure that +# groups never have more than this number of users on one line. +# This permit to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines, +# with the same group ID, to avoid limitation of the line length in the +# group file). +# +# 0 is the default value and disables this feature. +# +#MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP 0 + +# +# If useradd should create home directories for users by default (non +# system users only) +# This option is overridden with the -M or -m flags on the useradd command +# line. +# +#CREATE_HOME yes + diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/patches/README_PATCHES b/patches/source/shadow/patches/README_PATCHES new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1d1f2173a --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/patches/README_PATCHES @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + +r3054.diff: Fixed wrong format string +r3055.diff: Help output to stderr not stdout. +r3060.diff: Fix memory leaks +r3062.diff: Avoid memzero() on a possibly NULL pointer. +r3096.diff: Fix parsing of gshadow entries. +r3090.diff: Fix improper sanitizing of locale variables. +r3160.diff: Fixed limits support (non PAM enabled versions only) +r3194.diff: shell's name must be -su when a su fakes a login. +r3299.diff: man/ru/Makefile.am: Remove double inclusion of $(man_nopam) diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/patches/unused/r3299.diff b/patches/source/shadow/patches/unused/r3299.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a46b18f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/patches/unused/r3299.diff @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +Index: man/ru/Makefile.am +=================================================================== +--- man/ru/Makefile.am (revision 3298) ++++ man/ru/Makefile.am (revision 3299) +@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ + mandir = @mandir@/ru + + man_MANS = \ +- $(man_nopam) \ + chage.1 \ + chfn.1 \ + chgpasswd.8 \ diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000..98425e16a --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 0f6a809b7c4c9a8f4adb5b25808dd68000e17aa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com> +Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2013 +Subject: restrict "su -c" only when callee is not root + +Shadow 4.1.5 addressed a tty-hijacking vulnerability in "su -c" +(CVE-2005-4890) by detaching the controlling terminal in the non-PAM +case via a TIOCNOTTY request. + +Bi-directional protection is excessive and breaks a commonly-used +methods for privilege escalation on non-PAM systems (e.g. xterm -e +/bin/su -s /bin/bash -c /bin/bash myscript). + +This patch relaxes the restriction and only detaches the controlling +tty when the callee is not root (which is, after all, the threat vector). + +--- + src/su.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/su.c ++++ b/src/su.c +@@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) + + set_environment (pw); + +- if (!doshell) { ++ if (!doshell && pw->pw_uid != 0) { + /* There is no need for a controlling terminal. + * This avoids the callee to inject commands on +- * the caller's tty. */ ++ * the caller's tty when the callee is not root. */ + int err = -1; + + #ifdef USE_PAM diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/shadow.SlackBuild b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.SlackBuild new file mode 100755 index 000000000..e5143b8d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.SlackBuild @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Copyright 2005-2014 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, Minnesota, USA +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is +# permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of this script must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO +# EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +# PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; +# OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +# WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR +# OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF +# ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +PKGNAM=shadow +VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} +BUILD=${BUILD:-3_slack14.1} + +# Automatically determine the architecture we're building on: +if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then + case "$( uname -m )" in + i?86) export ARCH=i486 ;; + arm*) export ARCH=arm ;; + # Unless $ARCH is already set, use uname -m for all other archs: + *) export ARCH=$( uname -m ) ;; + esac +fi + +NUMJOBS=${NUMJOBS:--j6} + +CWD=$(pwd) +TMP=${TMP:-/tmp} +PKG=$TMP/package-shadow + +if [ "$ARCH" = "i486" ]; then + SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=i486 -mtune=i686" +elif [ "$ARCH" = "s390" ]; then + SLKCFLAGS="-O2" +elif [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ]; then + SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -fPIC" +else + SLKCFLAGS="-O2" +fi + +rm -rf $PKG +mkdir -p $TMP $PKG +cd $TMP +rm -rf shadow-$VERSION +tar xvf $CWD/shadow-$VERSION.tar.?z* || exit 1 +cd shadow-$VERSION + +# Apply some patches taken from the svn trunk that +# fix some of the more serious bugs in 4.1.4.3: +for patch in $CWD/patches/*.diff.gz ; do + zcat $patch | patch -p0 --verbose || exit 1 +done + +# Patch to handle newer crypt() that may return NULL: +zcat $CWD/shadow.glibc217-crypt.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + +# Relax the restrictions on "su -c" when it is used to become root. +# It's not likely that root is going to try to inject commands back into +# the user's shell to hack it, and the unnecessary restriction is causing +# breakage: +zcat $CWD/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + +# Re-run automake because of r3299 patch to man/ru/Makefile.am: +# (not used because it doesn't work... above patch does the intended fix) +#automake -f + +chown -R root:root . +find . \ + \( -perm 777 -o -perm 775 -o -perm 711 -o -perm 555 -o -perm 511 \) \ + -exec chmod 755 {} \; -o \ + \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \ + -exec chmod 644 {} \; + +CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \ +./configure \ + --prefix=/usr \ + --sysconfdir=/etc \ + --mandir=/usr/man \ + --docdir=/usr/doc/shadow-$VERSION \ + --disable-shared \ + --without-libcrack \ + --build=$ARCH-slackware-linux + +# --enable-utmpx # defaults to 'no' + +make $NUMJOBS || make || exit 1 +make install DESTDIR=$PKG || exit 1 + +# Fix user group = 100: +zcat $CWD/useradd.gz > $PKG/etc/default/useradd + +# /bin/groups is provided by coreutils. +rm -f $PKG/bin/groups +find $PKG -name groups.1 -exec rm {} \; + +# Install a login.defs with unsurprising defaults: +rm -f $PKG/etc/login.defs +zcat $CWD/login.defs.gz > $PKG/etc/login.defs.new + +mv $PKG/etc/login.access $PKG/etc/login.access.new + +# I don't think this works well enough to recommend it. +#mv $PKG/etc/limits $PKG/etc/limits.new +rm -f $PKG/etc/limits + +# Add the friendly 'adduser' script: +cat $CWD/adduser > $PKG/usr/sbin/adduser +chmod 0755 $PKG/usr/sbin/adduser + +# Add sulogin to the package: +cp -a src/sulogin $PKG/sbin +( cd $PKG/bin ; ln -s ../sbin/sulogin ) + +# Add the empty faillog log file: +mkdir -p $PKG/var/log +touch $PKG/var/log/faillog.new + +# Put some stuff back in "old" locations and make symlinks for compat +( cd $PKG/usr/bin + mv faillog ../sbin + mv lastlog ../sbin + ln -s ../sbin/faillog + ln -s ../sbin/lastlog +) + +# Use 4711 rather than 4755 permissions where setuid root is required: +find $PKG -type f -perm 4755 -exec chmod 4711 "{}" \; + +# Compress and if needed symlink the man pages: +if [ -d $PKG/usr/man ]; then + ( cd $PKG/usr/man + for manpagedir in $(find . -type d -name "man*") ; do + ( cd $manpagedir + for eachpage in $( find . -type l -maxdepth 1) ; do + ln -s $( readlink $eachpage ).gz $eachpage.gz + rm $eachpage + done + gzip -9 *.? + ) + done + ) +fi + +mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/shadow-$VERSION +cp -a \ + COPYING* NEWS README* TODO doc/{README*,HOWTO,WISHLIST,*.txt} \ + $PKG/usr/doc/shadow-$VERSION + +# If there's a ChangeLog, installing at least part of the recent history +# is useful, but don't let it get totally out of control: +if [ -r ChangeLog ]; then + DOCSDIR=$(echo $PKG/usr/doc/${PKGNAM}-$VERSION) + cat ChangeLog | head -n 1000 > $DOCSDIR/ChangeLog + touch -r ChangeLog $DOCSDIR/ChangeLog +fi + +mkdir -p $PKG/install +cat $CWD/slack-desc > $PKG/install/slack-desc +zcat $CWD/doinst.sh.gz > $PKG/install/doinst.sh + +cd $PKG +/sbin/makepkg -l y -c n $TMP/shadow-$VERSION-$ARCH-$BUILD.txz + diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/shadow.glibc217-crypt.diff b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.glibc217-crypt.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e26ca10bb --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.glibc217-crypt.diff @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +From a616a72160c17fa193ad6ad95eb2c869633f4fe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 11:25:43 +Subject: [PATCH] Improve handling of NULL returns from crypt(). + +Signed-off-by: mancha <mancha1@hush.com> +--- + ChangeLog | 15 +++++++++++++++ + lib/encrypt.c | 7 +++---- + lib/pwauth.c | 7 ++++++- + libmisc/valid.c | 1 + + src/chgpasswd.c | 4 ++++ + src/chpasswd.c | 4 ++++ + src/gpasswd.c | 4 ++++ + src/newgrp.c | 3 ++- + src/newusers.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- + src/passwd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 10 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index aab00ae..1416a38 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@ ++2013-05-06 mancha <mancha1@hush.com> ++ ++ * lib/encrypt.c: crypt() in glibc/eglibc 2.17 now fails if passed ++ a salt that violates specs. On Linux, crypt() also fails with ++ DES/MD5 salts in FIPS140 mode. Rather than exit() on NULL returns ++ we send them back to the caller for appropriate handling. ++ * lib/pwauth.c: Handle NULL return from crypt(). ++ * libmisc/valid.c: Likewise. ++ * src/chgpasswd.c: Likewise. ++ * src/chpasswd.c: Likewise. ++ * src/gpasswd.c: Likewise. ++ * src/newgrp.c: Likewise. ++ * src/newusers.c: Likewise. ++ * src/passwd.c: Likewise. ++ + 2012-05-25 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> + + * NEWS: Set release date. +diff --git a/lib/encrypt.c b/lib/encrypt.c +index 7daa8da..49cb691 100644 +--- a/lib/encrypt.c ++++ b/lib/encrypt.c +@@ -49,11 +49,10 @@ + if (!cp) { + /* + * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer, +- * and set errno to indicate an error. The caller doesn't +- * expect us to return NULL, so... ++ * and set errno to indicate an error. In this case return ++ * the NULL so the caller can handle appropriately. + */ +- perror ("crypt"); +- exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ return cp; + } + + /* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not +diff --git a/lib/pwauth.c b/lib/pwauth.c +index 4b26daa..086a72e 100644 +--- a/lib/pwauth.c ++++ b/lib/pwauth.c +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher, + char prompt[1024]; + char *clear = NULL; + const char *cp; ++ const char *encrypted; + int retval; + + #ifdef SKEY +@@ -177,7 +178,11 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher, + * the results there as well. + */ + +- retval = strcmp (pw_encrypt (input, cipher), cipher); ++ encrypted = pw_encrypt (input, cipher); ++ if (encrypted!=NULL) ++ retval = strcmp (encrypted, cipher); ++ else ++ retval = -1; + + #ifdef SKEY + /* +diff --git a/libmisc/valid.c b/libmisc/valid.c +index aa0390a..4b85d67 100644 +--- a/libmisc/valid.c ++++ b/libmisc/valid.c +@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ bool valid (const char *password, const struct passwd *ent) + */ + + if ( (NULL != ent->pw_name) ++ && (NULL != encrypted) + && (strcmp (encrypted, ent->pw_passwd) == 0)) { + return true; + } else { +diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c +index 0f41d0b..6c42a09 100644 +--- a/src/chgpasswd.c ++++ b/src/chgpasswd.c +@@ -469,6 +469,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) + #endif + cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd, + crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, arg)); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } + } + + /* +diff --git a/src/chpasswd.c b/src/chpasswd.c +index 928e2d7..4968b0d 100644 +--- a/src/chpasswd.c ++++ b/src/chpasswd.c +@@ -492,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) + #endif + cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd, + crypt_make_salt(crypt_method, arg)); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } + } + + /* +diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c +index df8d714..0043610 100644 +--- a/src/gpasswd.c ++++ b/src/gpasswd.c +@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr) + } + + cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL)); ++ if (cp==NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } + memzero (pass, sizeof pass); + #ifdef SHADOWGRP + if (is_shadowgrp) { +diff --git a/src/newgrp.c b/src/newgrp.c +index 9330c72..6b87761 100644 +--- a/src/newgrp.c ++++ b/src/newgrp.c +@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ static void check_perms (const struct group *grp, + cpasswd = pw_encrypt (cp, grp->gr_passwd); + strzero (cp); + +- if (grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' || ++ if (cpasswd == NULL || ++ grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' || + strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) { + #ifdef WITH_AUDIT + snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), +diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c +index 994898e..5f83a6a 100644 +--- a/src/newusers.c ++++ b/src/newusers.c +@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) + static void update_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) + { + void *crypt_arg = NULL; ++ char *cp; + if (crypt_method != NULL) { + #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT + if (sflg) { +@@ -398,9 +399,13 @@ static void update_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) + if ((crypt_method != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) { + pwd->pw_passwd = (char *)password; + } else { +- pwd->pw_passwd = pw_encrypt (password, +- crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, +- crypt_arg)); ++ cp=pw_encrypt (password, crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, ++ crypt_arg)); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ pwd->pw_passwd = cp; + } + } + #endif /* !USE_PAM */ +@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) + { + const struct spwd *sp; + struct spwd spent; ++ char *cp; + + #ifndef USE_PAM + void *crypt_arg = NULL; +@@ -448,7 +454,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) + } else { + const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, + crypt_arg); +- spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt); ++ cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ spent.sp_pwdp = cp; + } + spent.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE; + if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) { +@@ -492,7 +503,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) + spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password; + } else { + const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, crypt_arg); +- spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt); ++ cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ spent.sp_pwdp = cp; + } + #else + /* +diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c +index ac90aa3..ae26666 100644 +--- a/src/passwd.c ++++ b/src/passwd.c +@@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa + } + + cipher = pw_encrypt (clear, crypt_passwd); ++ if (cipher == NULL) { ++ strzero (clear); ++ (void) fprintf (stderr, ++ _("Failed to crypt password for %s.\n"), ++ pw->pw_name); ++ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, ++ "failed to crypt password for %s", ++ pw->pw_name)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + if (strcmp (cipher, crypt_passwd) != 0) { + strzero (clear); + strzero (cipher); +@@ -349,6 +360,10 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa + * Encrypt the password, then wipe the cleartext password. + */ + cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL)); ++ if (cp == NULL) { ++ perror ("crypt"); ++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } + memzero (pass, sizeof pass); + + #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST +-- +1.7.11.4 + diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/shadow.url b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.url new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b18864a85 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.url @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/slack-desc b/patches/source/shadow/slack-desc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..57749146e --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/slack-desc @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# HOW TO EDIT THIS FILE: +# The "handy ruler" below makes it easier to edit a package description. Line +# up the first '|' above the ':' following the base package name, and the '|' +# on the right side marks the last column you can put a character in. You must +# make exactly 11 lines for the formatting to be correct. It's also +# customary to leave one space after the ':'. + + |-----handy-ruler------------------------------------------------------| +shadow: shadow (shadow password suite) +shadow: +shadow: This set of login related programs utilizes an alternate, non-readable +shadow: file to contain the actual encrypted passwords. This is presumed to +shadow: increase system security by increasing the difficulty with which +shadow: system crackers obtain encrypted passwords. It was written by +shadow: Julianne Frances Haugh and the Linux port is maintained by Tomasz +shadow: Kloczko. +shadow: +shadow: This package provides 'login', which is needed to log into the system. +shadow: diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/useradd b/patches/source/shadow/useradd new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3205e496 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/shadow/useradd @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# useradd defaults file +GROUP=100 +HOME=/home +INACTIVE=-1 +EXPIRE= +SHELL=/bin/bash +SKEL=/etc/skel +CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes |