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-rw-r--r--patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff35
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..98425e16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/shadow/shadow.CVE-2005-4890.relax.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 0f6a809b7c4c9a8f4adb5b25808dd68000e17aa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2013
+Subject: restrict "su -c" only when callee is not root
+
+Shadow 4.1.5 addressed a tty-hijacking vulnerability in "su -c"
+(CVE-2005-4890) by detaching the controlling terminal in the non-PAM
+case via a TIOCNOTTY request.
+
+Bi-directional protection is excessive and breaks a commonly-used
+methods for privilege escalation on non-PAM systems (e.g. xterm -e
+/bin/su -s /bin/bash -c /bin/bash myscript).
+
+This patch relaxes the restriction and only detaches the controlling
+tty when the callee is not root (which is, after all, the threat vector).
+
+---
+ src/su.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ set_environment (pw);
+
+- if (!doshell) {
++ if (!doshell && pw->pw_uid != 0) {
+ /* There is no need for a controlling terminal.
+ * This avoids the callee to inject commands on
+- * the caller's tty. */
++ * the caller's tty when the callee is not root. */
+ int err = -1;
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM