Wed Feb 28 18:36:48 UTC 202420240228183648

d/parallel-20240222-noarch-1.txz:  Upgraded.
kde/krita-5.2.2-x86_64-4.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Recompiled against libunibreak-6.0.
l/accountsservice-23.13.9-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
  Thanks to reddog83.
l/libass-0.17.1-x86_64-2.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Recompiled against libunibreak-6.0.
l/libunibreak-6.0-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
  Shared library .so-version bump.
l/orc-0.4.38-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
l/python-requests-2.31.0-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
l/python-urllib3-2.2.1-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
l/qt6-6.6.2_20240210_15b7e743-x86_64-1.txz:  Added.
n/wpa_supplicant-2.10-x86_64-3.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Patched the implementation of PEAP in wpa_supplicant to prevent an
  authentication bypass. For a successful attack, wpa_supplicant must be
  configured to not verify the network's TLS certificate during Phase 1
  authentication, and an eap_peap_decrypt vulnerability can then be abused
  to skip Phase 2 authentication. The attack vector is sending an EAP-TLV
  Success packet instead of starting Phase 2. This allows an adversary to
  impersonate Enterprise Wi-Fi networks.
  For more information, see:
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52160
  (* Security fix *)
xap/gparted-1.6.0-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.

2 files changed, 214 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07263730f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
+Subject: PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
+
+The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
+authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
+during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
+specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
+is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
+the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
+unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
+devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
+user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
+
+Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
+authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
+resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
+configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
+authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
+strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
+issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
+session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
+
+Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
+configuration parameter option:
+'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
+tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
+ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
+ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
+   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
+   not used (default)
+ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 ++++++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 +++++
+ wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 +++++++
+ 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+index 26744ab68..58d5a1359 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+@@ -471,6 +471,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
+ 	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
+ 	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
+ 	 *
++	 * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
++	 * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
++	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
++	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
++	 *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
++	 *  not used (default)
++	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
++	 *
+ 	 * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
+ 	 * uuid=Device_UUID
+ 	 *
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+index 12e30df29..608069719 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
+ 	u8 cmk[20];
+ 	int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
+ 		  * is enabled. */
++	enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
++		data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
++	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
++		data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
++	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
++		data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
++	}
+ #ifdef EAP_TNC
+ 	if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
+ 		data->soh = 2;
+@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+ 	data->force_peap_version = -1;
+ 	data->peap_outer_success = 2;
+ 	data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
++	data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
+ 
+ 	if (config && config->phase1)
+ 		eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
+@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
++				   struct eap_peap_data *data)
++{
++	if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
++	     (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
++	      !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
++	      !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
++	     data->phase2_eap_started) &&
++	    !data->phase2_eap_success)
++		return false;
++	return true;
++}
++
++
+ /**
+  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
+  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
+@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
+ 					   " - force failed Phase 2");
+ 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
+ 				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
++			} else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++					   "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
++				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
++				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ 			} else {
+ 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
+ 				ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
+@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
+ 			/* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
+ 			 * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
+ 			 * been completed. */
+-			if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
+-			    !data->phase2_eap_success) {
++			if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
+ 					   "Success used to indicate success, "
+ 					   "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
+@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+ {
+ 	struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
++
+ 	return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
+-		data->phase2_success;
++		data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
+index 6193b4bdb..966cbd6c7 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
+@@ -242,6 +242,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ 
+ 	sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
+ 
++	if (!phase2)
++		data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
++			params->client_cert_blob ||
++			params->private_key ||
++			params->private_key_blob;
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
+index 9ac00121f..334863413 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
+@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
+ 	 * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
+ 	 */
+ 	int tls_v13;
++
++	/**
++	 * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
++	 */
++	bool client_cert_conf;
+ };
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+index f0b82443e..1b09f57d3 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+@@ -1370,6 +1370,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
+ #	 * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
+ #	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
+ #	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
++#	'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
++#	tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
++#	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
++#	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
++#	   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
++#	   not used (default)
++#	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
+ #	EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
+ #	pbc=1.
+ #
+-- 
+cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258
+
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
index 2f1a718eb..f99324697 100755
--- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
+++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
 
 PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant
 VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-2}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-3}
 
 SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -)
 
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch.gz | patch -p1
 # Allow legacy tls to avoid breaking WPA2-Enterprise:
 zcat $CWD/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 
+# CVE-2023-52160:
+zcat $CWD/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
 cd wpa_supplicant
 
 # Create the configuration file for building wpa_supplicant: