From 72065739ec0c24fdf21bba7d653b1ba05179b8d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick J Volkerding Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 18:36:48 +0000 Subject: Wed Feb 28 18:36:48 UTC 2024 d/parallel-20240222-noarch-1.txz: Upgraded. kde/krita-5.2.2-x86_64-4.txz: Rebuilt. Recompiled against libunibreak-6.0. l/accountsservice-23.13.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. Thanks to reddog83. l/libass-0.17.1-x86_64-2.txz: Rebuilt. Recompiled against libunibreak-6.0. l/libunibreak-6.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. Shared library .so-version bump. l/orc-0.4.38-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/python-requests-2.31.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/python-urllib3-2.2.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/qt6-6.6.2_20240210_15b7e743-x86_64-1.txz: Added. n/wpa_supplicant-2.10-x86_64-3.txz: Rebuilt. Patched the implementation of PEAP in wpa_supplicant to prevent an authentication bypass. For a successful attack, wpa_supplicant must be configured to not verify the network's TLS certificate during Phase 1 authentication, and an eap_peap_decrypt vulnerability can then be abused to skip Phase 2 authentication. The attack vector is sending an EAP-TLV Success packet instead of starting Phase 2. This allows an adversary to impersonate Enterprise Wi-Fi networks. For more information, see: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52160 (* Security fix *) xap/gparted-1.6.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. --- .../8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++ source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild | 5 +- 2 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch (limited to 'source/n') diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..07263730f --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +From 8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 +++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 +++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +index 26744ab68..58d5a1359 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -471,6 +471,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +index 12e30df29..608069719 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index 6193b4bdb..966cbd6c7 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -242,6 +242,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +index 9ac00121f..334863413 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index f0b82443e..1b09f57d3 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1370,6 +1370,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin= or + # pbc=1. + # +-- +cgit v1.2.3-18-g5258 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild index 2f1a718eb..f99324697 100755 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-2} +BUILD=${BUILD:-3} SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -) @@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch.gz | patch -p1 # Allow legacy tls to avoid breaking WPA2-Enterprise: zcat $CWD/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +# CVE-2023-52160: +zcat $CWD/patches/8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + cd wpa_supplicant # Create the configuration file for building wpa_supplicant: -- cgit v1.2.3