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author Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com>2018-05-25 23:29:36 +0000
committer Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com>2018-05-31 15:10:50 -0700
commit329684b59b8d55dd403c2c59f76d37210ba2f517 (patch)
tree10421c6ee3bf179d50915cc00d4c15c1b83cb77a /patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff
parentb76270bf9e6dd375e495fec92140a79a79415d27 (diff)
downloadcurrent-13.1.tar.gz
current-13.1.tar.xz
Fri May 25 23:29:36 UTC 201813.1
patches/packages/glibc-zoneinfo-2018e-noarch-2_slack13.1.txz: Rebuilt. Handle removal of US/Pacific-New timezone. If we see that the machine is using this, it will be automatically switched to US/Pacific.
Diffstat (limited to 'patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff')
-rw-r--r--patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff108
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff b/patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc37370bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/gnutls/gnutls-2.8.6_CVE-2014-0092.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From 27892001331da24704fca8fa39041289ff7d3cd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014
+Subject: CVE-2014-0092 (GNUTLS-SA-2014-2)
+
+Fix vulnerabilities in the certificate verification code path.
+The vulnerabilities can be exploited such that specially-crafted
+certificates can bypass certificate validation checks.
+
+This is a backport adaptation for use with GnuTLS 2.8.6.
+
+Relevant upstream commit:
+-------------------------
+https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/6aa26f78150ccb
+
+---
+ lib/x509/verify.c | 17 +++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/x509/verify.c
++++ b/lib/x509/verify.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ check_if_ca (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnu
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
+- goto cleanup;
++ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ result =
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ check_if_ca (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnu
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
+- goto cleanup;
++ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ result =
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ check_if_ca (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnu
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
+- goto cleanup;
++ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ result =
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ check_if_ca (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnu
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
+- goto cleanup;
++ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* If the subject certificate is the same as the issuer
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ check_if_ca (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnu
+ else
+ gnutls_assert ();
+
++fail:
+ result = 0;
+
+ cleanup:
+@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ _gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509
+ gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL, 0 };
+ gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL, 0 };
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer;
+- int ret, issuer_version, result;
++ int ret, issuer_version, result = 0;
+
+ if (output)
+ *output = 0;
+@@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ _gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509
+ if (issuer_version < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
+- return issuer_version;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN) &&
+@@ -320,6 +321,7 @@ _gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
++ result = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@ _gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509
+ if (result < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
++ result = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+@@ -337,6 +340,8 @@ _gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ gnutls_assert ();
++ result = 0;
++ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ else if (ret == 0)
+ {