From 8b19227b588fcfdd6e0e799637336f5e0c2bb3ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick J Volkerding Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 02:31:40 +0000 Subject: Thu May 16 02:31:40 UTC 2024 a/bcachefs-tools-1.7.0-x86_64-1.txz: Added. a/kernel-generic-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded. a/kernel-huge-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded. a/kernel-modules-6.9.0-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded. d/git-2.45.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. This update fixes security issues: Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to execute just-cloned code during the clone operation. Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3 are now extended to cover cloning local repositories. Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/ directory. It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the clone. For more information, see: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32002 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32004 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32020 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32021 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32465 (* Security fix *) d/kernel-headers-6.9.0-x86-2.txz: Upgraded. d/strace-6.9-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. k/kernel-source-6.9.0-noarch-2.txz: Upgraded. BCACHEFS_FS m -> y CRYPTO_CHACHA20 m -> y CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC m -> y CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC m -> y CRYPTO_POLY1305 m -> y MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE y -> n kde/wcslib-8.3-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. l/gdk-pixbuf2-2.42.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. ani: Reject files with multiple INA or IART chunks. ani: Reject files with multiple anih chunks. ani: validate chunk size. Thanks to 0xvhp, pedrib, and Benjamin Gilbert. For more information, see: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48622 (* Security fix *) l/gtk+3-3.24.42-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/bind-9.18.27-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. This is a bugfix release. n/popa3d-1.0.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt. This is a bugfix release: Build with AUTH_PAM, not AUTH_SHADOW. Thanks to jayjwa. x/xorg-server-xwayland-23.2.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt. kernels/*: Upgraded. usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt. --- source/k/build-all-kernels.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'source/k/build-all-kernels.sh') diff --git a/source/k/build-all-kernels.sh b/source/k/build-all-kernels.sh index e4b907bae..91ecb9983 100755 --- a/source/k/build-all-kernels.sh +++ b/source/k/build-all-kernels.sh @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) -BUILD=${BUILD:-1} +BUILD=${BUILD:-2} if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then # Get the filename of the newest kernel tarball: KERNEL_SOURCE_FILE="$(/bin/ls -t linux-*.tar.?z | head -n 1 )" -- cgit v1.2.3-80-g2a13