From 8ff4f2f51a6cf07fc33742ce3bee81328896e49b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick J Volkerding Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 23:29:36 +0000 Subject: Fri May 25 23:29:36 UTC 2018 patches/packages/glibc-zoneinfo-2018e-noarch-2_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. Handle removal of US/Pacific-New timezone. If we see that the machine is using this, it will be automatically switched to US/Pacific. --- ...r-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch (limited to 'patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch') diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9688802e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 26ef0a52797e8c3acd00c7a2bcb272abae73ca5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:40:18 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 06/31] dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers() + [CVE-2014-8094] + +ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count). +There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause +out of bound reads and memory corruption later on. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas +--- + hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c +index 4ab0186..c3dbb2f 100644 +--- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c ++++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c +@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client) + unsigned int *attachments; + + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4); ++ if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess, + &pDrawable, &status)) + return status; +-- +1.9.3 + -- cgit v1.2.3