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-rw-r--r--source/n/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-glibc217-crypt.diff105
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source/n/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-glibc217-crypt.diff b/source/n/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-glibc217-crypt.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2cbb48605
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source/n/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-glibc217-crypt.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From 0626e86d2e1d0be63a56918371a15d98cfad19d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013
+Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt().
+
+Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
+(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
+on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
+passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
+
+When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
+NULL pointer dereference.
+---
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++-
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 3 ++-
+ saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c | 3 ++-
+ saslauthd/auth_shadow.c | 7 ++-----
+ 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern char *crypt();
+ char *password;
+ {
+ char* r;
++ char* crpt_passwd;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+
+ pwd = getpwnam(userid);
+@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
+ else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
+ r = "Account disabled";
+ }
+- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
++ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ r = "Incorrect password";
+ }
+ else {
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern char *crypt();
+ char *pwcheck(userid, password)
+ char *userid;
+ char *password;
++char *crpt_passwd;
+ {
+ struct spwd *pwd;
+
+@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ char *password;
+ return "Userid not found";
+ }
+
+- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
++ if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ return "Incorrect password";
+ }
+ else {
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ {
+ /* VARIABLES */
+ struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */
++ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */
+ /* END VARIABLES */
+
+ pw = getpwnam(login);
+@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ RETURN("NO");
+ }
+
+- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
++ if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
+ RETURN("NO");
+ }
+
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+@@ -180,16 +180,13 @@ auth_shadow (
+ * not returning any information about a login until we have validated
+ * the password.
+ */
+- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
+- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
++ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
+ if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
+ sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
+ }
+- free(cpw);
+ RETURN("NO");
+ }
+- free(cpw);
+
+ /*
+ * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
+@@ -251,7 +250,7 @@ auth_shadow (
+ RETURN("NO");
+ }
+
+- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
++ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
+ if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
+ password, upw->upw_passwd);