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-rw-r--r--patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch36
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9688802e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0006-dri2-integer-overflow-in-ProcDRI2GetBuffers-CVE-2014.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 26ef0a52797e8c3acd00c7a2bcb272abae73ca5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:40:18 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 06/31] dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers()
+ [CVE-2014-8094]
+
+ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count).
+There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause
+out of bound reads and memory corruption later on.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
+Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
+index 4ab0186..c3dbb2f 100644
+--- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
++++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
+@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client)
+ unsigned int *attachments;
+
+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4);
++ if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4))
++ return BadLength;
++
+ if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess,
+ &pDrawable, &status))
+ return status;
+--
+1.9.3
+