diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2034f285c --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0003-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 7909f70e73f40113608fba3ddb657c05c3276da1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 03/31] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4] + +GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies +them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over +all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a +potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with +a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly +calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. + +This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname +lists for X access control are insane. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +--- + os/access.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/os/access.c b/os/access.c +index 88a44d9..e7d668a 100644 +--- a/os/access.c ++++ b/os/access.c +@@ -1323,6 +1323,10 @@ GetHosts(pointer *data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled) + for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { + nHosts++; + n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry); ++ /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of ++ hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */ ++ if (n >= 1048576) ++ break; + } + if (n) { + *data = ptr = malloc(n); +@@ -1331,6 +1335,8 @@ GetHosts(pointer *data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled) + } + for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { + len = host->len; ++ if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) ++ break; + ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family; + ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len; + ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry); +-- +1.9.3 + |