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-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch174
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch250
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch184
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch79
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch64
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch132
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch43
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch82
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt226
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/README.slackware55
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config37
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.desktop7
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.pngbin0 -> 5124 bytes
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.conf2
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.logrotate6
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/doinst.sh15
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff16
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff20
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff50
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff16
-rw-r--r--patches/source/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc18
-rwxr-xr-xpatches/source/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild181
22 files changed, 1657 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..727684865
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index 4e04169..333035f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+ struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++ int set = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+ * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+ * does not support full AP client state.
++ *
++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++ * the same key.
+ */
+- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++ set = 0;
++ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+ if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+ sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+ sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+- sta->added_unassoc)) {
++ set)) {
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+ HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+ "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++ set ? "set" : "add");
+
+ if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 3587086..707971d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ }
+
+
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++ return 0;
++ return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1802d664a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t tk_len;
+ };
+
++struct wpa_gtk {
++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+ * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++ keyidx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++ broadcast_ether_addr,
++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
++
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+ {
+@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ie->igtk) {
+ size_t len;
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+- u16 keyidx;
++
+ len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ return -1;
++
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+- igtk->igtk, len);
+- if (keyidx > 4095) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
+- }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+- int clear_ptk = 1;
++ int clear_keys = 1;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ /* Prepare for the next transition */
+ wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+
+- clear_ptk = 0;
++ clear_keys = 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+- if (clear_ptk) {
++ if (clear_keys) {
+ /*
+ * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+- u16 keyidx;
+-
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+- igd.igtk, keylen);
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+- "WNM mode");
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
+- }
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2937b851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+- const u8 *key_rsc)
++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
+- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++ int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
+ key_rsc = null_rsc;
+
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
+ wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
+ goto failed;
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ "WNM mode");
+@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22ee21794
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+This fixes the earlier fix in commit
+ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
+driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
+possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
+message 3/4.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index d200285..1021ccb 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+ sm->tptk_set = 1;
+- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
+
+ kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
+ kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
+@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+ const u8 *key_rsc;
+
+- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return 0;
+@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
+ int ptk_set, tptk_set;
+ unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
+- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
+ u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+ u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
+ int renew_snonce;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c19c4c710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+ u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1bd5a572
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index e424168..9eb9738 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ }
+
+
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++ if (nonce[i])
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ peer->cipher = cipher;
+
+- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ /*
+ * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ goto error;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85ea1d62b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
+ request
+
+Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
+Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
+response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
+association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
+successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
+protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+
+ if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
++ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ return;
+ }
+
++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
++
+ if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
+ wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9678f681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+ /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ u16 capab;
+
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+
+ buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ int ft_completed;
++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ccb5098c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation
+
+Published: October 16, 2017
+Identifiers:
+- CERT case ID: VU#228519
+- CVE-2017-13077
+- CVE-2017-13078
+- CVE-2017-13079
+- CVE-2017-13080
+- CVE-2017-13081
+- CVE-2017-13082
+- CVE-2017-13084 (not applicable)
+- CVE-2017-13086
+- CVE-2017-13087
+- CVE-2017-13088
+Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
+
+
+Vulnerability
+
+A vulnerability was found in how a number of implementations can be
+triggered to reconfigure WPA/WPA2/RSN keys (TK, GTK, or IGTK) by
+replaying a specific frame that is used to manage the keys. Such
+reinstallation of the encryption key can result in two different types
+of vulnerabilities: disabling replay protection and significantly
+reducing the security of encryption to the point of allowing frames to
+be decrypted or some parts of the keys to be determined by an attacker
+depending on which cipher is used.
+
+This document focuses on the cases that apply to systems using hostapd
+(AP) or wpa_supplicant (station), but it should be noted that the
+generic vulnerability itself is applicable to other implementations and
+may have different impact in other cases.
+
+This vulnerability can in theory apply to any case where a TK (the
+pairwise/unicast encryption key used with TKIP, CCMP, GCMP), a GTK
+(group/multicast encryption key), or an IGTK (group management frame
+integrity protection key) is configured by the Authentication/Supplicant
+component to the WLAN driver/firmware taking care of the TX/RX path and
+encryption/decryption of frames.
+
+If the same key is configured multiple times, it is likely that the
+transmit and receive packet numbers (PN, IPN, RSC/TSC, etc.) are cleared
+to a smaller value (zero in case of pairwise keys, zero or at least a
+smaller value than the last used value in case of group keys). When this
+happens with the same key, this breaks replay protection on RX side and
+can result in reuse of packet numbers on TX side. The former may allow
+replaying of previously delivered packets (without the attacker being
+able to decrypt them or modify their contents) while the latter may
+result in more severe issues on the TX side due to resulting CCM nonce
+replay and related issues with GCMP and TKIP. The TX side issue may make
+it significantly easier for the attacker to decrypt frames and determine
+some parts of the keys (e.g., a Michael MIC key in case of TKIP).
+
+Impact on AP/hostapd
+
+On the AP side, this generic issue has been determined to be applicable
+in the case where hostapd is used to operate an RSN/WPA2 network with FT
+(Fast BSS Transition from IEEE 802.11r) enabled. Replaying of the
+Reassociation Request frame can be used to get the AP reinstalling the
+TK which results in the AP accepting previously delivered unicast frames
+from the station and the AP reusing previously used packet numbers
+(local TX packet number gets reset to zero). This latter issue on the TX
+side can result in CCM nonce reuse which invalidates CCMP security
+properties. In case of TKIP this can result in the attacker being able
+to determine part of the TK more easily and with GCMP, result in similar
+issues.
+
+It should be noted that the AP side issue with FT would be close to
+applying to FILS authentication (from IEEE 802.11ai) in hostapd with
+replaying of (Re)Association Request frames. However, due to a different
+handling of the repeated association processing with FILS, this would
+actually result in the station getting immediately disconnected which
+prevents this attack in practice. In addition, the FILS implementation
+in the current hostapd version is still experimental and documented as
+being discouraged in production use cases.
+
+Another area of potentially reduced security was identified when looking
+into these issues. When AP/Authenticator implementation in hostapd is
+requested to rekey the PTK without performing EAP reauthentication
+(either through local periodic rekeying or due to a request from an
+association station), the ANonce value does not get updated. This
+results in the new 4-way handshake depending on the station/supplicant
+side generating a new, unique (for the current PMK/PSK) SNonce for the
+PTK derivation to result in a new key. While a properly working
+supplicant would do so, if there is a supplicant implementation that
+does not, this combination could result in deriving the same PTK
+again. When the TK from that PTK gets configured in the driver, this
+would result in reinstalling the same key and the same issues as
+described above for the FT protocol case.
+
+Impact on station/wpa_supplicant
+
+On the station side, this generic issue has been determined to be
+applicable in the cases where wpa_supplicant processes a group key (GTK
+or IGTK) update from the AP. An attacker that is able to limit access
+to frame delivery may be able to extract two update messages and deliver
+those to the station with significant time delay between them. When
+wpa_supplicant processes the second message, it may end up reinstalling
+the same key to the driver and when doing this, clear the RX packet
+number to an old value. This would allow the attacker to replay all
+group-addressed frames that the AP sent between the time the key update
+message was originally sent and the time when the attacker forwarded the
+second frame to the station. The attacker would not be able to decrypt
+or modify the frames based on this vulnerability, though. There is an
+exception to this with older wpa_supplicant versions as noted below in
+version specific notes.
+
+For the current wpa_supplicant version (v2.6), there is also an
+additional EAPOL-Key replay sequence where an additional forged
+EAPOL-Key message can be used to bypass the existing protection for the
+pairwise key reconfiguration in a manner that ends up configuring a
+known TK that an attacker could use to decrypt any frame sent by the
+station and to inject arbitrary unicast frames. Similar issues are
+reachable in older versions as noted below.
+
+PeerKey / TDLS PeerKey
+
+As far as the related CVE-2017-13084 (reinstallation of the STK key in
+the PeerKey handshake) is concerned, it should be noted that PeerKey
+implementation in wpa_supplicant is not fully functional and the actual
+installation of the key into the driver does not work. As such, this
+item is not applicable in practice. Furthermore, the PeerKey handshake
+for IEEE 802.11e DLS is obsolete and not known to have been deployed.
+
+As far as the TDLS PeerKey handshake is concerned (CVE-2017-13086),
+wpa_supplicant implementation is already rejecting TPK M2 retries, so
+the reconfiguration issue cannot apply for it. For TPK M3, there is a
+theoretical impact. However, if that frame is replayed, the current
+wpa_supplicant implementation ends up tearing down the TDLS link
+immediately and as such, there is no real window for performing the
+attack. Furthermore, TPK M3 goes through the AP path and if RSN is used
+there, that frame has replay protection, so the attacker could not
+perform the attack. If the AP path were to use WEP, the frame could be
+replayed, though. That said, if WEP is used on the AP path, it would be
+fair to assume that there is no security in the network, so a new attack
+vector would be of small additional value.
+
+With older wpa_supplicant versions, it may be possible for an attacker
+to cause TPK M2 to be retransmitted with delay that would be able to
+trigger reinstallation of TK on the peer receiving TPK M2
+(CVE-2017-13086). This may open a short window for the attack with v2.3,
+v2.4, and v2.5; and a longer window with older versions.
+
+Vulnerable versions/configurations
+
+For the AP/Authenticator TK (unicast) reinstallation in FT protocol
+(CVE-2017-13082):
+
+hostapd v0.7.2 and newer with FT enabled (i.e., practically all versions
+that include full FT implementation). FT needs to be enabled in the
+runtime configuration to make this applicable.
+
+For the AP/Authenticator missing ANonce during PTK rekeying:
+
+All hostapd versions.
+
+For the station/Supplicant side GTK/IGTK reinstallation and TK
+configuration:
+
+All wpa_supplicant versions. The impact on older versions can be more
+severe due to earlier changes in this area: v2.3 and older can also
+reinstall the pairwise key and as such have similar impact as the AP FT
+case (CVE-2017-13077); v2.4 and v2.5 end up configuring an all-zero TK
+which breaks the normal data path, but could allow an attacker to
+decrypt all following frames from the station and to inject arbitrary
+frames to the station. In addition, a different message sequence
+involving 4-way handshake can result in configuration of an all-zero TK
+in v2.6 and the current snapshot of the development repository as of the
+publication of this advisory.
+
+
+Acknowledgments
+
+Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
+Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Thanks to John A. Van
+Boxtel for finding additional issues related to this topic.
+
+
+Possible mitigation steps
+
+- For AP/hostapd and FT replay issue (CVE-2017-13082), it is possible to
+ prevent the issue temporarily by disabling FT in runtime
+ configuration, if needed before being able to update the
+ implementations.
+
+- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild them:
+
+ hostapd and replayed FT reassociation request frame (CVE-2017-13082):
+ hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+ hostapd PTK rekeying and ANonce update:
+ Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+ wpa_supplicant and GTK/IGTK rekeying (CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
+ CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088):
+ Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+ Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep Mode cases
+
+ wpa_supplicant (v2.6 or newer snapshot) and known TK issue:
+ Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+ Additional protection steps for wpa_supplicant:
+ TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+ WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request
+ FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+ These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/
+ (both against the snapshot of hostap.git master branch and rebased on
+ top of the v2.6 release)
+
+ For the TDLS TPK M2 retransmission issue (CVE-2017-13086) with older
+ wpa_supplicant versions, consider updating to the latest version or
+ merge in a commit that is present in v2.6:
+ https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=dabdef9e048b17b22b1c025ad592922eab30dda8
+ ('TDLS: Ignore incoming TDLS Setup Response retries')
+
+- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available
+ * it should be noted that there are number of additional changes in
+ the related areas of the implementation to provide extra layer of
+ protection for potential unknown issues; these changes are not
+ included in this advisory as they have not been identified to be
+ critical for preventing any of the identified security
+ vulnerabilities; however, users of hostapd/wpa_supplicant are
+ encouraged to consider merging such changes even if not fully
+ moving to v2.7
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/README.slackware b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/README.slackware
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ab40a289
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/README.slackware
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+=================================================
+How do I get my card to use WPA-PSK in Slackware?
+=================================================
+
+First off: wpa_supplicant REQUIRES the AP to broadcast the SSID. When the AP
+hides its SSID, all you will get out of wpa_supplicant is the message:
+"No suitable AP found"
+
+Also, read the MADwifi FAQ (http://madwifi.sourceforge.net/dokuwiki/doku.php)
+since it contains a wealth of information.
+
+This being said, you'll have to do the following (as root):
+Edit the file named /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf and add these lines:
+
+network={
+ scan_ssid=0
+ proto=WPA
+ key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
+ pairwise=CCMP TKIP
+ group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
+}
+
+Then execute:
+
+/usr/sbin/wpa_passphrase YOURSSID passphrase
+
+with the SSID of your AP and the passphrase you've entered in its WPA-PSK configuration. You'll receive an output, which looks like this:
+
+network={
+ ssid="YOURSSID"
+ #psk="passphrase"
+
+psk=66a4bfb03de5656cf26cfa03a116097546046f4aea11ee044b841171207d8308
+}
+
+Copy the three lines within the network-tag into your own entry in wpa_supplicant.conf and change the permissions after you've finished editing:
+
+chmod 640 /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
+
+To get your network device up and running, execute:
+
+### /usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -Bw -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf -iath0 -Dmadwifi ###
+### you don't have to run the above command by hand, because it will ###
+### be executed by the rc.inet1 command that you run: ###
+
+/etc/rc.d/rc.inet1 ath0_start
+
+In case you want to see the wpa_supplicant in action, start it on the command line before enabling the wireless device, by running:
+/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -dw -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf -iath0 -Dmadwifi
+The terminal where you've started the wpa_supplicant should now show the communication between your wlan card and the AP. If you got everything up and running you can let Slackware's init script take over by killing wpa_supplicant and running:
+
+/etc/rc.d/rc.inet1 ath0_restart
+
+Studying the wpa_supplicant README is also highly recommended for further insight!
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45593ac6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+CONFIG_AP=y
+CONFIG_BACKEND=file
+CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y
+CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y
+CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y
+CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y
+CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y
+CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y
+CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y
+CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y
+CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y
+CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y
+CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y
+CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y
+CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y
+CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y
+CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+CONFIG_LIBNL32=y
+CONFIG_P2P=y
+CONFIG_PEERKEY=y
+CONFIG_PKCS12=y
+CONFIG_READLINE=y
+CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y
+CONFIG_WPS=y
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.desktop b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.desktop
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31b8b6b01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.desktop
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Desktop Entry]
+Name=wpa_gui
+Comment[en]=Wpa_supplicant management
+Exec=kdesu wpa_gui
+Icon=wpa_gui
+Type=Application
+Categories=Qt;Network;
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.png b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a72f35691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_gui.png
Binary files differ
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.conf b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.conf
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4dbbf96a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
+ctrl_interface_group=root
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.logrotate b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.logrotate
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd7ef91cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/config/wpa_supplicant.logrotate
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/var/log/wpa_supplicant.log {
+ missingok
+ notifempty
+ size 30k
+ create 0600 root root
+}
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/doinst.sh b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/doinst.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6052fca4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/doinst.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+config() {
+ NEW="$1"
+ OLD="$(dirname $NEW)/$(basename $NEW .new)"
+ # If there's no config file by that name, mv it over:
+ if [ ! -r $OLD ]; then
+ mv $NEW $OLD
+ elif [ "$(cat $OLD | md5sum)" = "$(cat $NEW | md5sum)" ]; then
+ # toss the redundant copy
+ rm $NEW
+ fi
+ # Otherwise, we leave the .new copy for the admin to consider...
+}
+
+config etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.new
+config etc/logrotate.d/wpa_supplicant.new
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8be4d2cdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2013-01-12 09:42:53.000000000 -0600
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.0/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2013-05-11 14:09:34.586718122 -0500
+@@ -1666,10 +1666,10 @@
+
+ if (assoc_failed) {
+ /* give IBSS a bit more time */
+- timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 10 : 5;
++ timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 10;
+ } else if (wpa_s->conf->ap_scan == 1) {
+ /* give IBSS a bit more time */
+- timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 10;
++ timeout = ssid->mode == WPAS_MODE_IBSS ? 20 : 20;
+ }
+ wpa_supplicant_req_auth_timeout(wpa_s, timeout, 0);
+ }
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e2449f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in
+--- wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in 2012-04-16 15:15:40.000000000 -0500
++++ wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in 2012-05-06 01:07:44.523999837 -0500
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ [D-BUS Service]
+ Name=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant
+-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
++Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid
+ User=root
+ SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
+diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in
+--- wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in 2012-04-16 15:15:40.000000000 -0500
++++ wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in 2012-05-06 01:06:59.528589953 -0500
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ [D-BUS Service]
+ Name=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1
+-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
++Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid
+ User=root
+ SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d6af7b39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/utils/wpa_debug.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c 2013-01-12 09:42:53.000000000 -0600
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/utils/wpa_debug.c 2013-05-11 14:10:37.886101742 -0500
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
+ if (out_file) {
+ fprintf(out_file, "%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec,
+ (unsigned int) tv.usec);
++ fflush(out_file);
+ } else
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */
+ printf("%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec, (unsigned int) tv.usec);
+@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@
+ if (out_file) {
+ vfprintf(out_file, fmt, ap);
+ fprintf(out_file, "\n");
++ fflush(out_file);
+ } else {
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */
+ vprintf(fmt, ap);
+@@ -357,6 +359,7 @@
+ fprintf(out_file, " [REMOVED]");
+ }
+ fprintf(out_file, "\n");
++ fflush(out_file);
+ } else {
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */
+ printf("%s - hexdump(len=%lu):", title, (unsigned long) len);
+@@ -425,12 +428,14 @@
+ fprintf(out_file,
+ "%s - hexdump_ascii(len=%lu): [REMOVED]\n",
+ title, (unsigned long) len);
++ fflush(out_file);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ fprintf(out_file,
+ "%s - hexdump_ascii(len=%lu): [NULL]\n",
+ title, (unsigned long) len);
++ fflush(out_file);
+ return;
+ }
+ fprintf(out_file, "%s - hexdump_ascii(len=%lu):\n",
+@@ -455,6 +460,7 @@
+ pos += llen;
+ len -= llen;
+ }
++ fflush(out_file);
+ } else {
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */
+ if (!show) {
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f85e8102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+--- ./wpa_supplicant/events.c.orig 2017-01-05 11:29:16.968898845 -0600
++++ ./wpa_supplicant/events.c 2017-01-05 11:31:13.515907254 -0600
+@@ -1555,11 +1555,11 @@
+ if (wpa_s->last_scan_req == MANUAL_SCAN_REQ &&
+ wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id && wpa_s->own_scan_running &&
+ own_request && !(data && data->scan_info.external_scan)) {
+- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u",
++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u",
+ wpa_s->manual_scan_id);
+ wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id = 0;
+ } else {
+- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS);
++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS);
+ }
+ wpas_notify_scan_results(wpa_s);
+
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4313b3783
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# HOW TO EDIT THIS FILE:
+# The "handy ruler" below makes it easier to edit a package description. Line
+# up the first '|' above the ':' following the base package name, and the '|'
+# on the right side marks the last column you can put a character in. You must
+# make exactly 11 lines for the formatting to be correct. It's also
+# customary to leave one space after the ':'.
+ |-----handy-ruler------------------------------------------------------|
+wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant (WPA/WPA2/IEEE 802.1X Supplicant)
+wpa_supplicant:
+wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant is a WPA Supplicant for Linux with support for WPA and
+wpa_supplicant: WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i / RSN). Supplicant is the IEEE 802.1X/WPA
+wpa_supplicant: component that is used in the client stations. It implements key
+wpa_supplicant: negotiation with a WPA Authenticator and it controls the roaming and
+wpa_supplicant: IEEE 802.11 authentication/association of the wlan driver.
+wpa_supplicant:
+wpa_supplicant: More info: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/
+wpa_supplicant:
+wpa_supplicant:
diff --git a/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..d00d7eaea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright 2004-2008 Eric Hameleers, Eindhoven, NL
+# Copyright 2008-2015 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for
+# any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that
+# the above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all
+# copies.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED
+# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS AND COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND THEIR
+# CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+# LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF
+# USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+# ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
+# OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT
+# OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+# SUCH DAMAGE.
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant
+VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1_slack14.2}
+
+SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -)
+
+# Automatically determine the architecture we're building on:
+if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
+ case "$( uname -m )" in
+ i?86) export ARCH=i586 ;;
+ arm*) export ARCH=arm ;;
+ # Unless $ARCH is already set, use uname -m for all other archs:
+ *) export ARCH=$( uname -m ) ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+NUMJOBS=${NUMJOBS:-" -j7 "}
+
+if [ "$ARCH" = "i586" ]; then
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=i586 -mtune=i686"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
+elif [ "$ARCH" = "s390" ]; then
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
+elif [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ]; then
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -fPIC"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX="64"
+elif [ "$ARCH" = "arm" ]; then
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=armv4 -mtune=xscale"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
+elif [ "$ARCH" = "armel" ]; then
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=armv4t"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
+else
+ SLKCFLAGS="-O2"
+ LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
+fi
+
+CWD=$(pwd)
+TMP=${TMP:-/tmp}
+PKG=$TMP/package-$PKGNAM
+
+rm -rf $PKG
+mkdir -p $TMP $PKG
+cd $TMP
+rm -rf ${PKGNAM}-${SRCVERSION}
+tar xvf $CWD/${PKGNAM}-${SRCVERSION}.tar.?z* || exit 1
+cd ${PKGNAM}-${SRCVERSION}
+chown -R root:root .
+find . \
+ \( -perm 777 -o -perm 775 -o -perm 711 -o -perm 555 -o -perm 511 \) \
+ -exec chmod 755 {} \; -o \
+ \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \
+ -exec chmod 644 {} \;
+
+
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1
+
+# Fixup various paths in the dbus service file
+cat $CWD/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
+# Eliminate some logspam
+cat $CWD/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
+# Apply a couple of other patches from Fedora
+cat $CWD/patches/assoc-timeout.diff | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+cat $CWD/patches/flush-debug-output.diff | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
+cd wpa_supplicant
+
+# Create the configuration file for building wpa_supplicant:
+cat $CWD/config/dot.config > .config
+
+# Build the usual binaries
+CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
+make $NUMJOBS \
+ BINDIR=/usr/sbin \
+ LIBDIR=/usr/lib${LIBDIRSUFFIX} || exit 1
+
+# Build the Qt4 GUI client
+CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
+make $NUMJOBS \
+ wpa_gui-qt4 \
+ BINDIR=/usr/sbin \
+ LIBDIR=/usr/lib${LIBDIRSUFFIX} || exit 1
+
+# Make sure man pages are built
+make -C doc/docbook man
+
+# This goes into the doc directory later on:
+mv wpa_supplicant.conf wpa_supplicant.conf.sample
+
+# Install binaries:
+mkdir -p $PKG/usr/sbin $PKG/usr/bin
+cp wpa_supplicant wpa_passphrase wpa_cli $PKG/usr/sbin/
+cp wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui $PKG/usr/bin/
+
+find $PKG | xargs file | grep -e "executable" -e "shared object" | grep ELF \
+ | cut -f 1 -d : | xargs strip --strip-unneeded 2> /dev/null
+
+# Install dbus configuration file:
+mkdir -p $PKG/etc/dbus-1/system.d/
+cp dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf \
+ $PKG/etc/dbus-1/system.d/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf
+
+mkdir -p $PKG/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services
+install -m644 dbus/*.service $PKG/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/
+
+# Install a .desktop file and icon for wpa_gui:
+# (converted from the wpa_gui.svg in the source)
+mkdir -p $PKG/usr/share/{applications,pixmaps}
+cat $CWD/config/wpa_gui.desktop > $PKG/usr/share/applications/wpa_gui.desktop
+cat $CWD/config/wpa_gui.png > $PKG/usr/share/pixmaps/wpa_gui.png
+
+# Install a logrotate config
+mkdir -p $PKG/etc/logrotate.d
+cat $CWD/config/wpa_supplicant.logrotate > $PKG/etc/logrotate.d/wpa_supplicant.new
+
+# Install man pages:
+for m in 5 8; do
+ mkdir -p $PKG/usr/man/man${m}
+ cp doc/docbook/*.${m} $PKG/usr/man/man${m}/
+done
+find $PKG/usr/man -type f -name "*.?" -exec gzip -9f {} \;
+
+# Install a default configuration file (only readable by root):
+mkdir -p $PKG/etc
+cat $CWD/config/wpa_supplicant.conf > $PKG/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.new
+chmod 600 $PKG/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.new
+
+mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/$PKGNAM-$VERSION
+cp -a \
+ ChangeLog ../COPYING README README-{P2P,WPS} examples *.txt *.sample $CWD/README.slackware \
+ $PKG/usr/doc/$PKGNAM-$VERSION
+chown -R root:root $PKG/usr/doc/$PKGNAM-$VERSION/*
+chmod -R a-w $PKG/usr/doc/$PKGNAM-$VERSION/*
+
+# If there's a ChangeLog, installing at least part of the recent history
+# is useful, but don't let it get totally out of control:
+if [ -r ChangeLog ]; then
+ DOCSDIR=$(echo $PKG/usr/doc/${PKGNAM}-$VERSION)
+ cat ChangeLog | head -n 1000 > $DOCSDIR/ChangeLog
+ touch -r ChangeLog $DOCSDIR/ChangeLog
+fi
+
+mkdir -p $PKG/install
+cat $CWD/slack-desc > $PKG/install/slack-desc
+zcat $CWD/doinst.sh.gz >> $PKG/install/doinst.sh
+
+cd $PKG
+/sbin/makepkg -l y -c n $TMP/${PKGNAM}-${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD}.txz