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-rw-r--r--patches/source/dbus/dbus.expat222fix.diff74
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/dbus/dbus.expat222fix.diff b/patches/source/dbus/dbus.expat222fix.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4d7f9b741
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/dbus/dbus.expat222fix.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 4397b56a3c31ce0a1b99f528f2422d406ddbc2c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 10:46:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] config-loader-expat: Tell Expat not to defend against hash
+ collisions
+
+By default, Expat uses cryptographic-quality random numbers as a salt for
+its hash algorithm, and since 2.2.1 it gets them from the getrandom
+syscall on Linux. That syscall refuses to return any entropy until the
+kernel's CSPRNG (random pool) has been initialized. Unfortunately, this
+can take as long as 40 seconds on embedded devices with few entropy
+sources, which is too long: if the system dbus-daemon blocks for that
+length of time, important D-Bus clients like systemd and systemd-logind
+time out and fail to connect to it.
+
+We're parsing small configuration files here, and we trust them
+completely, so we don't need to defend against hash collisions: nobody
+is going to be crafting them to cause pathological performance.
+
+Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101858
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
+---
+ bus/config-loader-expat.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ configure.ac | 8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/bus/config-loader-expat.c b/bus/config-loader-expat.c
+index b571fda3..27cbe2d0 100644
+--- a/bus/config-loader-expat.c
++++ b/bus/config-loader-expat.c
+@@ -203,6 +203,20 @@ bus_config_load (const DBusString *file,
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
++ /* We do not need protection against hash collisions (CVE-2012-0876)
++ * because we are only parsing trusted XML; and if we let Expat block
++ * waiting for the CSPRNG to be initialized, as it does by default to
++ * defeat CVE-2012-0876, it can cause timeouts during early boot on
++ * entropy-starved embedded devices.
++ *
++ * TODO: When Expat gets a more explicit API for this than
++ * XML_SetHashSalt, check for that too, and use it preferentially.
++ * https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/issues/91 */
++#if defined(HAVE_XML_SETHASHSALT)
++ /* Any nonzero number will do. https://xkcd.com/221/ */
++ XML_SetHashSalt (expat, 4);
++#endif
++
+ if (!_dbus_string_get_dirname (file, &dirname))
+ {
+ dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, NULL);
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index e819611a..77548169 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -938,6 +938,14 @@ XML_CFLAGS=
+ AC_SUBST([XML_CFLAGS])
+ AC_SUBST([XML_LIBS])
+
++save_cflags="$CFLAGS"
++save_libs="$LIBS"
++CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $XML_CFLAGS"
++LIBS="$LIBS $XML_LIBS"
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([XML_SetHashSalt])
++CFLAGS="$save_cflags"
++LIBS="$save_libs"
++
+ # Thread lib detection
+ AC_ARG_VAR([THREAD_LIBS])
+ save_libs="$LIBS"
+--
+2.13.3
+
+