diff options
| author |   Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2018-12-29 23:13:15 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2018-12-30 08:59:46 +0100 |
| commit | 527328c5da0d2375ca5dfc2a053c9fe328839918 (patch) | |
| tree | d2773d407aba234712f864db90e15c99a9e08da5 /source/n | |
| parent | 1e1c447e2ef274f8b3733ba21570e74c3bc757b7 (diff) | |
| download | current-527328c5da0d2375ca5dfc2a053c9fe328839918.tar.gz current-527328c5da0d2375ca5dfc2a053c9fe328839918.tar.xz | |
Sat Dec 29 23:13:15 UTC 201820181229231315
a/kernel-generic-4.19.13-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-huge-4.19.13-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
a/kernel-modules-4.19.13-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
d/doxygen-1.8.15-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
d/kernel-headers-4.19.13-x86-1.txz: Upgraded.
k/kernel-source-4.19.13-noarch-1.txz: Upgraded.
FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_DEFERRED_TAKEOVER y -> n
l/libsecret-0.18.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
n/wpa_supplicant-2.6-x86_64-6.txz: Upgraded.
It seems we're not the only ones with broken WPA2-Enterprise support
with wpa_supplicant-2.7, so we'll fix it the same way as everyone else -
by reverting to wpa_supplicant-2.6 for now.
isolinux/initrd.img: Rebuilt.
kernels/*: Upgraded.
testing/packages/wpa_supplicant-2.7-x86_64-2.txz: Upgraded.
Applied a patch from Gentoo to allow building CONFIG_IEEE80211X=y without
the experimental CONFIG_FILS=y option.
usb-and-pxe-installers/usbboot.img: Rebuilt.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/n')
15 files changed, 1586 insertions, 585 deletions
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..727684865 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +index 4e04169..333035f 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 3587086..707971d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1802d664a --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the +sequence counter associated to the group key. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t tk_len; + }; + ++struct wpa_gtk { ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t gtk_len; ++}; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++struct wpa_igtk { ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t igtk_len; ++}; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + /* WPA IE version 1 + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", +@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + + ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++{ ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); ++ ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", ++ keyidx); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), ++ broadcast_ether_addr, ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ ++ ++ + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) + { +@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (ie->igtk) { + size_t len; + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; +- u16 keyidx; ++ + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) + return -1; ++ + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", +- igtk->igtk, len); +- if (keyidx > 4095) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); +- return -1; +- } +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } + } + + return 0; +@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) + */ + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + { +- int clear_ptk = 1; ++ int clear_keys = 1; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + /* Prepare for the next transition */ + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); + +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + +- if (clear_ptk) { ++ if (clear_keys) { + /* + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. +@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS +@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); +@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; +- u16 keyidx; +- +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); +- +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); +- +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", +- igd.igtk, keylen); +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " +- "WNM mode"); +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; ++ ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ + +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2937b851 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep + Mode cases + +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to +detect a possible key reconfiguration. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { + + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, +- const u8 *key_rsc) ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) + { + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); +@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, + gtk_len, gtk_len, + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, ++ int wnm_sleep) + { + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", + keyidx); +@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + } + +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + } + +@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) + key_rsc = null_rsc; + +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) + goto failed; + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + +@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); +@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " + "WNM mode"); +@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) + return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22ee21794 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. + +This fixes the earlier fix in commit +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of +message 3/4. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index d200285..1021ccb 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t kck_len; + size_t kek_len; + size_t tk_len; ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ + }; + + struct wpa_gtk { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm, + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + } + sm->tptk_set = 1; +- sm->tk_to_set = 1; + + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; +@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + enum wpa_alg alg; + const u8 *key_rsc; + +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); + return 0; +@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); +- sm->tk_to_set = 0; ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; + int ptk_set, tptk_set; + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ + int renew_snonce; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c19c4c710 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + } + + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e1bd5a572 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so +that behavior does not get modified. + +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. + +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +index e424168..9eb9738 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ + } tpk; + int tpk_set; ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ + int tpk_success; + int tpk_in_progress; + +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + u8 rsc[6]; + enum wpa_alg alg; + ++ if (peer->tk_set) { ++ /* ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must ++ * not allow that to happen. ++ */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); + + switch (peer->cipher) { +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + return -1; + } + ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " + "driver"); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 1; + return 0; + } + +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + peer->cipher = 0; + peer->qos_info = 0; + peer->wmm_capable = 0; +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, + } + + ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { ++ if (nonce[i]) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + const u8 *buf, size_t len) + { +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; + peer->cipher = cipher; + +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { + /* + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); + goto error; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + } + + #if 0 +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..85ea1d62b --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending + request + +Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep +Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the +response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the +association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when +successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of +protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + + if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association"); ++ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested"); + return; + } + +@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + return; + } + ++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; ++ + if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || + wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b9678f681 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected +Reassociation Response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, + u16 capab; + + sm->ft_completed = 0; ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; + + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); + return -1; +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; ++ + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) + return -1; + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { + size_t r0kh_id_len; + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; + int ft_completed; ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; + int over_the_ds_in_progress; + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ + int set_ptk_after_assoc; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5ccb5098c --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation + +Published: October 16, 2017 +Identifiers: +- CERT case ID: VU#228519 +- CVE-2017-13077 +- CVE-2017-13078 +- CVE-2017-13079 +- CVE-2017-13080 +- CVE-2017-13081 +- CVE-2017-13082 +- CVE-2017-13084 (not applicable) +- CVE-2017-13086 +- CVE-2017-13087 +- CVE-2017-13088 +Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/ + + +Vulnerability + +A vulnerability was found in how a number of implementations can be +triggered to reconfigure WPA/WPA2/RSN keys (TK, GTK, or IGTK) by +replaying a specific frame that is used to manage the keys. Such +reinstallation of the encryption key can result in two different types +of vulnerabilities: disabling replay protection and significantly +reducing the security of encryption to the point of allowing frames to +be decrypted or some parts of the keys to be determined by an attacker +depending on which cipher is used. + +This document focuses on the cases that apply to systems using hostapd +(AP) or wpa_supplicant (station), but it should be noted that the +generic vulnerability itself is applicable to other implementations and +may have different impact in other cases. + +This vulnerability can in theory apply to any case where a TK (the +pairwise/unicast encryption key used with TKIP, CCMP, GCMP), a GTK +(group/multicast encryption key), or an IGTK (group management frame +integrity protection key) is configured by the Authentication/Supplicant +component to the WLAN driver/firmware taking care of the TX/RX path and +encryption/decryption of frames. + +If the same key is configured multiple times, it is likely that the +transmit and receive packet numbers (PN, IPN, RSC/TSC, etc.) are cleared +to a smaller value (zero in case of pairwise keys, zero or at least a +smaller value than the last used value in case of group keys). When this +happens with the same key, this breaks replay protection on RX side and +can result in reuse of packet numbers on TX side. The former may allow +replaying of previously delivered packets (without the attacker being +able to decrypt them or modify their contents) while the latter may +result in more severe issues on the TX side due to resulting CCM nonce +replay and related issues with GCMP and TKIP. The TX side issue may make +it significantly easier for the attacker to decrypt frames and determine +some parts of the keys (e.g., a Michael MIC key in case of TKIP). + +Impact on AP/hostapd + +On the AP side, this generic issue has been determined to be applicable +in the case where hostapd is used to operate an RSN/WPA2 network with FT +(Fast BSS Transition from IEEE 802.11r) enabled. Replaying of the +Reassociation Request frame can be used to get the AP reinstalling the +TK which results in the AP accepting previously delivered unicast frames +from the station and the AP reusing previously used packet numbers +(local TX packet number gets reset to zero). This latter issue on the TX +side can result in CCM nonce reuse which invalidates CCMP security +properties. In case of TKIP this can result in the attacker being able +to determine part of the TK more easily and with GCMP, result in similar +issues. + +It should be noted that the AP side issue with FT would be close to +applying to FILS authentication (from IEEE 802.11ai) in hostapd with +replaying of (Re)Association Request frames. However, due to a different +handling of the repeated association processing with FILS, this would +actually result in the station getting immediately disconnected which +prevents this attack in practice. In addition, the FILS implementation +in the current hostapd version is still experimental and documented as +being discouraged in production use cases. + +Another area of potentially reduced security was identified when looking +into these issues. When AP/Authenticator implementation in hostapd is +requested to rekey the PTK without performing EAP reauthentication +(either through local periodic rekeying or due to a request from an +association station), the ANonce value does not get updated. This +results in the new 4-way handshake depending on the station/supplicant +side generating a new, unique (for the current PMK/PSK) SNonce for the +PTK derivation to result in a new key. While a properly working +supplicant would do so, if there is a supplicant implementation that +does not, this combination could result in deriving the same PTK +again. When the TK from that PTK gets configured in the driver, this +would result in reinstalling the same key and the same issues as +described above for the FT protocol case. + +Impact on station/wpa_supplicant + +On the station side, this generic issue has been determined to be +applicable in the cases where wpa_supplicant processes a group key (GTK +or IGTK) update from the AP. An attacker that is able to limit access +to frame delivery may be able to extract two update messages and deliver +those to the station with significant time delay between them. When +wpa_supplicant processes the second message, it may end up reinstalling +the same key to the driver and when doing this, clear the RX packet +number to an old value. This would allow the attacker to replay all +group-addressed frames that the AP sent between the time the key update +message was originally sent and the time when the attacker forwarded the +second frame to the station. The attacker would not be able to decrypt +or modify the frames based on this vulnerability, though. There is an +exception to this with older wpa_supplicant versions as noted below in +version specific notes. + +For the current wpa_supplicant version (v2.6), there is also an +additional EAPOL-Key replay sequence where an additional forged +EAPOL-Key message can be used to bypass the existing protection for the +pairwise key reconfiguration in a manner that ends up configuring a +known TK that an attacker could use to decrypt any frame sent by the +station and to inject arbitrary unicast frames. Similar issues are +reachable in older versions as noted below. + +PeerKey / TDLS PeerKey + +As far as the related CVE-2017-13084 (reinstallation of the STK key in +the PeerKey handshake) is concerned, it should be noted that PeerKey +implementation in wpa_supplicant is not fully functional and the actual +installation of the key into the driver does not work. As such, this +item is not applicable in practice. Furthermore, the PeerKey handshake +for IEEE 802.11e DLS is obsolete and not known to have been deployed. + +As far as the TDLS PeerKey handshake is concerned (CVE-2017-13086), +wpa_supplicant implementation is already rejecting TPK M2 retries, so +the reconfiguration issue cannot apply for it. For TPK M3, there is a +theoretical impact. However, if that frame is replayed, the current +wpa_supplicant implementation ends up tearing down the TDLS link +immediately and as such, there is no real window for performing the +attack. Furthermore, TPK M3 goes through the AP path and if RSN is used +there, that frame has replay protection, so the attacker could not +perform the attack. If the AP path were to use WEP, the frame could be +replayed, though. That said, if WEP is used on the AP path, it would be +fair to assume that there is no security in the network, so a new attack +vector would be of small additional value. + +With older wpa_supplicant versions, it may be possible for an attacker +to cause TPK M2 to be retransmitted with delay that would be able to +trigger reinstallation of TK on the peer receiving TPK M2 +(CVE-2017-13086). This may open a short window for the attack with v2.3, +v2.4, and v2.5; and a longer window with older versions. + +Vulnerable versions/configurations + +For the AP/Authenticator TK (unicast) reinstallation in FT protocol +(CVE-2017-13082): + +hostapd v0.7.2 and newer with FT enabled (i.e., practically all versions +that include full FT implementation). FT needs to be enabled in the +runtime configuration to make this applicable. + +For the AP/Authenticator missing ANonce during PTK rekeying: + +All hostapd versions. + +For the station/Supplicant side GTK/IGTK reinstallation and TK +configuration: + +All wpa_supplicant versions. The impact on older versions can be more +severe due to earlier changes in this area: v2.3 and older can also +reinstall the pairwise key and as such have similar impact as the AP FT +case (CVE-2017-13077); v2.4 and v2.5 end up configuring an all-zero TK +which breaks the normal data path, but could allow an attacker to +decrypt all following frames from the station and to inject arbitrary +frames to the station. In addition, a different message sequence +involving 4-way handshake can result in configuration of an all-zero TK +in v2.6 and the current snapshot of the development repository as of the +publication of this advisory. + + +Acknowledgments + +Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU +Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Thanks to John A. Van +Boxtel for finding additional issues related to this topic. + + +Possible mitigation steps + +- For AP/hostapd and FT replay issue (CVE-2017-13082), it is possible to + prevent the issue temporarily by disabling FT in runtime + configuration, if needed before being able to update the + implementations. + +- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild them: + + hostapd and replayed FT reassociation request frame (CVE-2017-13082): + hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + + hostapd PTK rekeying and ANonce update: + Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + + wpa_supplicant and GTK/IGTK rekeying (CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079, + CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088): + Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep Mode cases + + wpa_supplicant (v2.6 or newer snapshot) and known TK issue: + Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + + Additional protection steps for wpa_supplicant: + TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request + FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + + These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/ + (both against the snapshot of hostap.git master branch and rebased on + top of the v2.6 release) + + For the TDLS TPK M2 retransmission issue (CVE-2017-13086) with older + wpa_supplicant versions, consider updating to the latest version or + merge in a commit that is present in v2.6: + https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=dabdef9e048b17b22b1c025ad592922eab30dda8 + ('TDLS: Ignore incoming TDLS Setup Response retries') + +- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available + * it should be noted that there are number of additional changes in + the related areas of the implementation to provide extra layer of + protection for potential unknown issues; these changes are not + included in this advisory as they have not been identified to be + critical for preventing any of the identified security + vulnerabilities; however, users of hostapd/wpa_supplicant are + encouraged to consider merging such changes even if not fully + moving to v2.7 diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config index bcc9f056a..1c7f67df4 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config @@ -1,595 +1,44 @@ -# Example wpa_supplicant build time configuration -# -# This file lists the configuration options that are used when building the -# wpa_supplicant binary. All lines starting with # are ignored. Configuration -# option lines must be commented out complete, if they are not to be included, -# i.e., just setting VARIABLE=n is not disabling that variable. -# -# This file is included in Makefile, so variables like CFLAGS and LIBS can also -# be modified from here. In most cases, these lines should use += in order not -# to override previous values of the variables. - - -# Uncomment following two lines and fix the paths if you have installed OpenSSL -# or GnuTLS in non-default location -#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/openssl/include -#LIBS += -L/usr/local/openssl/lib - -# Some Red Hat versions seem to include kerberos header files from OpenSSL, but -# the kerberos files are not in the default include path. Following line can be -# used to fix build issues on such systems (krb5.h not found). -#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/kerberos - -# Driver interface for generic Linux wireless extensions -# Note: WEXT is deprecated in the current Linux kernel version and no new -# functionality is added to it. nl80211-based interface is the new -# replacement for WEXT and its use allows wpa_supplicant to properly control -# the driver to improve existing functionality like roaming and to support new -# functionality. -CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y - -# Driver interface for Linux drivers using the nl80211 kernel interface +CONFIG_AP=y +CONFIG_BACKEND=file +CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y - -# QCA vendor extensions to nl80211 -#CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211_QCA=y - -# driver_nl80211.c requires libnl. If you are compiling it yourself -# you may need to point hostapd to your version of libnl. -# -#CFLAGS += -I$<path to libnl include files> -#LIBS += -L$<path to libnl library files> - -# Use libnl v2.0 (or 3.0) libraries. -#CONFIG_LIBNL20=y - -# Use libnl 3.2 libraries (if this is selected, CONFIG_LIBNL20 is ignored) -CONFIG_LIBNL32=y - - -# Driver interface for FreeBSD net80211 layer (e.g., Atheros driver) -#CONFIG_DRIVER_BSD=y -#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include -#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib -#LIBS_p += -L/usr/local/lib -#LIBS_c += -L/usr/local/lib - -# Driver interface for Windows NDIS -#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDIS=y -#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/w32api/ddk -#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib -# For native build using mingw -#CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS=y -# Additional directories for cross-compilation on Linux host for mingw target -#CFLAGS += -I/opt/mingw/mingw32/include/ddk -#LIBS += -L/opt/mingw/mingw32/lib -#CC=mingw32-gcc -# By default, driver_ndis uses WinPcap for low-level operations. This can be -# replaced with the following option which replaces WinPcap calls with NDISUIO. -# However, this requires that WZC is disabled (net stop wzcsvc) before starting -# wpa_supplicant. -# CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y - -# Driver interface for wired Ethernet drivers +CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y - -# Driver interface for MACsec capable Qualcomm Atheros drivers -#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_QCA=y - -# Driver interface for Linux MACsec drivers -#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y - -# Driver interface for the Broadcom RoboSwitch family -#CONFIG_DRIVER_ROBOSWITCH=y - -# Driver interface for no driver (e.g., WPS ER only) -#CONFIG_DRIVER_NONE=y - -# Solaris libraries -#LIBS += -lsocket -ldlpi -lnsl -#LIBS_c += -lsocket - -# Enable IEEE 802.1X Supplicant (automatically included if any EAP method or -# MACsec is included) -CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y - -# EAP-MD5 -CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y - -# EAP-MSCHAPv2 -CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y - -# EAP-TLS -CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y - -# EAL-PEAP -CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y - -# EAP-TTLS -CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y - -# EAP-FAST -# Note: If OpenSSL is used as the TLS library, OpenSSL 1.0 or newer is needed -# for EAP-FAST support. Older OpenSSL releases would need to be patched, e.g., -# with openssl-0.9.8x-tls-extensions.patch, to add the needed functions. +CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y - -# EAP-GTC +CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y +CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y - -# EAP-OTP +CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y +CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y +CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y +CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y - -# EAP-SIM (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-SIM is used) -#CONFIG_EAP_SIM=y - -# EAP-PSK (experimental; this is _not_ needed for WPA-PSK) -#CONFIG_EAP_PSK=y - -# EAP-pwd (secure authentication using only a password) -#CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y - -# EAP-PAX CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y - -# LEAP -CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y - -# EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used) -#CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y - -# EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used). -# This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too. -#CONFIG_EAP_AKA_PRIME=y - -# Enable USIM simulator (Milenage) for EAP-AKA -#CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR=y - -# EAP-SAKE +CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y - -# EAP-GPSK -CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y -# Include support for optional SHA256 cipher suite in EAP-GPSK -CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y - -# EAP-TNC and related Trusted Network Connect support (experimental) +CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y - -# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) -CONFIG_WPS=y -# Enable WPS external registrar functionality -#CONFIG_WPS_ER=y -# Disable credentials for an open network by default when acting as a WPS -# registrar. -#CONFIG_WPS_REG_DISABLE_OPEN=y -# Enable WPS support with NFC config method -#CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y - -# EAP-IKEv2 -CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y - -# EAP-EKE -#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y - -# MACsec -#CONFIG_MACSEC=y - -# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from -# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx) +CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y +CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y +CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y +CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y +CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y +CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y +CONFIG_LIBNL32=y +CONFIG_P2P=y +CONFIG_PEERKEY=y CONFIG_PKCS12=y - -# Smartcard support (i.e., private key on a smartcard), e.g., with openssl -# engine. -CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y - -# PC/SC interface for smartcards (USIM, GSM SIM) -# Enable this if EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA is included -#CONFIG_PCSC=y - -# Support HT overrides (disable HT/HT40, mask MCS rates, etc.) -#CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y - -# Support VHT overrides (disable VHT, mask MCS rates, etc.) -#CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y - -# Development testing -#CONFIG_EAPOL_TEST=y - -# Select control interface backend for external programs, e.g, wpa_cli: -# unix = UNIX domain sockets (default for Linux/*BSD) -# udp = UDP sockets using localhost (127.0.0.1) -# udp6 = UDP IPv6 sockets using localhost (::1) -# named_pipe = Windows Named Pipe (default for Windows) -# udp-remote = UDP sockets with remote access (only for tests systems/purpose) -# udp6-remote = UDP IPv6 sockets with remote access (only for tests purpose) -# y = use default (backwards compatibility) -# If this option is commented out, control interface is not included in the -# build. -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y - -# Include support for GNU Readline and History Libraries in wpa_cli. -# When building a wpa_cli binary for distribution, please note that these -# libraries are licensed under GPL and as such, BSD license may not apply for -# the resulting binary. CONFIG_READLINE=y - -# Include internal line edit mode in wpa_cli. This can be used as a replacement -# for GNU Readline to provide limited command line editing and history support. -#CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y - -# Remove debugging code that is printing out debug message to stdout. -# This can be used to reduce the size of the wpa_supplicant considerably -# if debugging code is not needed. The size reduction can be around 35% -# (e.g., 90 kB). -#CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG=y - -# Remove WPA support, e.g., for wired-only IEEE 802.1X supplicant, to save -# 35-50 kB in code size. -#CONFIG_NO_WPA=y - -# Remove IEEE 802.11i/WPA-Personal ASCII passphrase support -# This option can be used to reduce code size by removing support for -# converting ASCII passphrases into PSK. If this functionality is removed, the -# PSK can only be configured as the 64-octet hexstring (e.g., from -# wpa_passphrase). This saves about 0.5 kB in code size. -#CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE=y - -# Disable scan result processing (ap_mode=1) to save code size by about 1 kB. -# This can be used if ap_scan=1 mode is never enabled. -#CONFIG_NO_SCAN_PROCESSING=y - -# Select configuration backend: -# file = text file (e.g., wpa_supplicant.conf; note: the configuration file -# path is given on command line, not here; this option is just used to -# select the backend that allows configuration files to be used) -# winreg = Windows registry (see win_example.reg for an example) -CONFIG_BACKEND=file - -# Remove configuration write functionality (i.e., to allow the configuration -# file to be updated based on runtime configuration changes). The runtime -# configuration can still be changed, the changes are just not going to be -# persistent over restarts. This option can be used to reduce code size by -# about 3.5 kB. -#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE=y - -# Remove support for configuration blobs to reduce code size by about 1.5 kB. -#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS=y - -# Select program entry point implementation: -# main = UNIX/POSIX like main() function (default) -# main_winsvc = Windows service (read parameters from registry) -# main_none = Very basic example (development use only) -#CONFIG_MAIN=main - -# Select wrapper for operating system and C library specific functions -# unix = UNIX/POSIX like systems (default) -# win32 = Windows systems -# none = Empty template -#CONFIG_OS=unix - -# Select event loop implementation -# eloop = select() loop (default) -# eloop_win = Windows events and WaitForMultipleObject() loop -#CONFIG_ELOOP=eloop - -# Should we use poll instead of select? Select is used by default. -#CONFIG_ELOOP_POLL=y - -# Should we use epoll instead of select? Select is used by default. -#CONFIG_ELOOP_EPOLL=y - -# Should we use kqueue instead of select? Select is used by default. -#CONFIG_ELOOP_KQUEUE=y - -# Select layer 2 packet implementation -# linux = Linux packet socket (default) -# pcap = libpcap/libdnet/WinPcap -# freebsd = FreeBSD libpcap -# winpcap = WinPcap with receive thread -# ndis = Windows NDISUIO (note: requires CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y) -# none = Empty template -#CONFIG_L2_PACKET=linux - -# Disable Linux packet socket workaround applicable for station interface -# in a bridge for EAPOL frames. This should be uncommented only if the kernel -# is known to not have the regression issue in packet socket behavior with -# bridge interfaces (commit 'bridge: respect RFC2863 operational state')'). -#CONFIG_NO_LINUX_PACKET_SOCKET_WAR=y - -# IEEE 802.11w (management frame protection), also known as PMF -# Driver support is also needed for IEEE 802.11w. -CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y - -# Select TLS implementation -# openssl = OpenSSL (default) -# gnutls = GnuTLS -# internal = Internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental) -# linux = Linux kernel AF_ALG and internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental) -# none = Empty template -#CONFIG_TLS=openssl - -# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.1) -# can be enabled to get a stronger construction of messages when block ciphers -# are used. It should be noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based -# implementation may not be compatible with TLS v1.1 message (ClientHello is -# sent prior to negotiating which version will be used) -#CONFIG_TLSV11=y - -# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.2) -# can be enabled to enable use of stronger crypto algorithms. It should be -# noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based implementation may not be compatible -# with TLS v1.2 message (ClientHello is sent prior to negotiating which version -# will be used) -#CONFIG_TLSV12=y - -# Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not -# specify them. +CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="PROFILE=SYSTEM:3DES" - -# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are -# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of -# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits -# and drawbacks of this option. -#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH=y -#ifndef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH -#LTM_PATH=/usr/src/libtommath-0.39 -#CFLAGS += -I$(LTM_PATH) -#LIBS += -L$(LTM_PATH) -#LIBS_p += -L$(LTM_PATH) -#endif -# At the cost of about 4 kB of additional binary size, the internal LibTomMath -# can be configured to include faster routines for exptmod, sqr, and div to -# speed up DH and RSA calculation considerably -#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH_FAST=y - -# Include NDIS event processing through WMI into wpa_supplicant/wpasvc. -# This is only for Windows builds and requires WMI-related header files and -# WbemUuid.Lib from Platform SDK even when building with MinGW. -#CONFIG_NDIS_EVENTS_INTEGRATED=y -#PLATFORMSDKLIB="/opt/Program Files/Microsoft Platform SDK/Lib" - -# Add support for old DBus control interface -# (fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant) -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y - -# Add support for new DBus control interface -# (fi.w1.hostap.wpa_supplicant1) -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y - -# Add introspection support for new DBus control interface -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y - -# Add support for loading EAP methods dynamically as shared libraries. -# When this option is enabled, each EAP method can be either included -# statically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=y) or dynamically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=dyn). -# Dynamic EAP methods are build as shared objects (eap_*.so) and they need to -# be loaded in the beginning of the wpa_supplicant configuration file -# (see load_dynamic_eap parameter in the example file) before being used in -# the network blocks. -# -# Note that some shared parts of EAP methods are included in the main program -# and in order to be able to use dynamic EAP methods using these parts, the -# main program must have been build with the EAP method enabled (=y or =dyn). -# This means that EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST cannot be added as dynamic libraries -# unless at least one of them was included in the main build to force inclusion -# of the shared code. Similarly, at least one of EAP-SIM/AKA must be included -# in the main build to be able to load these methods dynamically. -# -# Please also note that using dynamic libraries will increase the total binary -# size. Thus, it may not be the best option for targets that have limited -# amount of memory/flash. -#CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y - -# IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) for station mode -#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y - -# Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt) -CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y - -# Send debug messages to syslog instead of stdout -CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y -# Set syslog facility for debug messages -#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG_FACILITY=LOG_DAEMON - -# Add support for sending all debug messages (regardless of debug verbosity) -# to the Linux kernel tracing facility. This helps debug the entire stack by -# making it easy to record everything happening from the driver up into the -# same file, e.g., using trace-cmd. -#CONFIG_DEBUG_LINUX_TRACING=y - -# Add support for writing debug log to Android logcat instead of standard -# output -#CONFIG_ANDROID_LOG=y - -# Enable privilege separation (see README 'Privilege separation' for details) -#CONFIG_PRIVSEP=y - -# Enable mitigation against certain attacks against TKIP by delaying Michael -# MIC error reports by a random amount of time between 0 and 60 seconds -#CONFIG_DELAYED_MIC_ERROR_REPORT=y - -# Enable tracing code for developer debugging -# This tracks use of memory allocations and other registrations and reports -# incorrect use with a backtrace of call (or allocation) location. -#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y -# For BSD, uncomment these. -#LIBS += -lexecinfo -#LIBS_p += -lexecinfo -#LIBS_c += -lexecinfo - -# Use libbfd to get more details for developer debugging -# This enables use of libbfd to get more detailed symbols for the backtraces -# generated by CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y. -#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE_BFD=y -# For BSD, uncomment these. -#LIBS += -lbfd -liberty -lz -#LIBS_p += -lbfd -liberty -lz -#LIBS_c += -lbfd -liberty -lz - -# wpa_supplicant depends on strong random number generation being available -# from the operating system. os_get_random() function is used to fetch random -# data when needed, e.g., for key generation. On Linux and BSD systems, this -# works by reading /dev/urandom. It should be noted that the OS entropy pool -# needs to be properly initialized before wpa_supplicant is started. This is -# important especially on embedded devices that do not have a hardware random -# number generator and may by default start up with minimal entropy available -# for random number generation. -# -# As a safety net, wpa_supplicant is by default trying to internally collect -# additional entropy for generating random data to mix in with the data fetched -# from the OS. This by itself is not considered to be very strong, but it may -# help in cases where the system pool is not initialized properly. However, it -# is very strongly recommended that the system pool is initialized with enough -# entropy either by using hardware assisted random number generator or by -# storing state over device reboots. -# -# wpa_supplicant can be configured to maintain its own entropy store over -# restarts to enhance random number generation. This is not perfect, but it is -# much more secure than using the same sequence of random numbers after every -# reboot. This can be enabled with -e<entropy file> command line option. The -# specified file needs to be readable and writable by wpa_supplicant. -# -# If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong random data (e.g., on -# Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of random -# data from /dev/urandom), the internal wpa_supplicant random pool can be -# disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this -# should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on devices -# that meet the requirements described above. -#CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y - -# IEEE 802.11n (High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) -CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y - -# IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) -# (depends on CONFIG_IEEE80211N) -CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y - -# Wireless Network Management (IEEE Std 802.11v-2011) -# Note: This is experimental and not complete implementation. -#CONFIG_WNM=y - -# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u) -# This can be used to enable functionality to improve interworking with -# external networks (GAS/ANQP to learn more about the networks and network -# selection based on available credentials). -#CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y - -# Hotspot 2.0 -#CONFIG_HS20=y - -# Enable interface matching in wpa_supplicant -#CONFIG_MATCH_IFACE=y - -# Disable roaming in wpa_supplicant -#CONFIG_NO_ROAMING=y - -# AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant -# This can be used for controlling AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant. It -# should be noted that this is mainly aimed at simple cases like -# WPA2-Personal while more complex configurations like WPA2-Enterprise with an -# external RADIUS server can be supported with hostapd. -CONFIG_AP=y - -# P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) -# This can be used to enable P2P support in wpa_supplicant. See README-P2P for -# more information on P2P operations. -CONFIG_P2P=y - -# Enable TDLS support -#CONFIG_TDLS=y - -# Wi-Fi Direct -# This can be used to enable Wi-Fi Direct extensions for P2P using an external -# program to control the additional information exchanges in the messages. CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y - -# Autoscan -# This can be used to enable automatic scan support in wpa_supplicant. -# See wpa_supplicant.conf for more information on autoscan usage. -# -# Enabling directly a module will enable autoscan support. -# For exponential module: -#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y -# For periodic module: -#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y - -# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage -# These optional mechanisms can be used to add support for storing passwords -# and other secrets in external (to wpa_supplicant) location. This allows, for -# example, operating system specific key storage to be used -# -# External password backend for testing purposes (developer use) -#CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y - -# Enable Fast Session Transfer (FST) -#CONFIG_FST=y - -# Enable CLI commands for FST testing -#CONFIG_FST_TEST=y - -# OS X builds. This is only for building eapol_test. -#CONFIG_OSX=y - -# Automatic Channel Selection -# This will allow wpa_supplicant to pick the channel automatically when channel -# is set to "0". -# -# TODO: Extend parser to be able to parse "channel=acs_survey" as an alternative -# to "channel=0". This would enable us to eventually add other ACS algorithms in -# similar way. -# -# Automatic selection is currently only done through initialization, later on -# we hope to do background checks to keep us moving to more ideal channels as -# time goes by. ACS is currently only supported through the nl80211 driver and -# your driver must have survey dump capability that is filled by the driver -# during scanning. -# -# TODO: In analogy to hostapd be able to customize the ACS survey algorithm with -# a newly to create wpa_supplicant.conf variable acs_num_scans. -# -# Supported ACS drivers: -# * ath9k -# * ath5k -# * ath10k -# -# For more details refer to: -# http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Documentation/acs -#CONFIG_ACS=y - -# Support Multi Band Operation -#CONFIG_MBO=y - -# Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS) (IEEE 802.11ai) -# Note: This is an experimental and not yet complete implementation. This -# should not be enabled for production use. -#CONFIG_FILS=y -# FILS shared key authentication with PFS -#CONFIG_FILS_SK_PFS=y - -# Support RSN on IBSS networks -# This is needed to be able to use mode=1 network profile with proto=RSN and -# key_mgmt=WPA-PSK (i.e., full key management instead of WPA-None). -CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y - -# External PMKSA cache control -# This can be used to enable control interface commands that allow the current -# PMKSA cache entries to be fetched and new entries to be added. -#CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y - -# Mesh Networking (IEEE 802.11s) -#CONFIG_MESH=y - -# Background scanning modules -# These can be used to request wpa_supplicant to perform background scanning -# operations for roaming within an ESS (same SSID). See the bgscan parameter in -# the wpa_supplicant.conf file for more details. -# Periodic background scans based on signal strength -CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y -# Learn channels used by the network and try to avoid bgscans on other -# channels (experimental) -#CONFIG_BGSCAN_LEARN=y - -# Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) -# Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt -#CONFIG_OWE=y +CONFIG_WPS=y +#CONFIG_MACSEC=y +#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bee574a5c --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +From 25b37c54a47e49d591f5752bbf0f510480402cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> +Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 11:14:10 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OpenSSL: Fix private key password handling with OpenSSL + >= 1.1.0f + +Since OpenSSL version 1.1.0f, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the +callback from the SSL object instead of the one from the CTX, so let's +set the callback on both SSL and CTX. Note that +SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*() is available only in 1.1.0. + +Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit f665c93e1d28fbab3d9127a8c3985cc32940824f) +--- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index c4170b6..bceb8c3 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -2779,6 +2779,15 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, + } else + passwd = NULL; + ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++ /* ++ * In OpenSSL >= 1.1.0f SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the callback ++ * from the SSL object. See OpenSSL commit d61461a75253. ++ */ ++ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, tls_passwd_cb); ++ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(conn->ssl, passwd); ++#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ ++ /* Keep these for OpenSSL < 1.1.0f */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, tls_passwd_cb); + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, passwd); + +@@ -2869,6 +2878,9 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, + return -1; + } + ERR_clear_error(); ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL); ++#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); + os_free(passwd); + +-- +2.9.3 + +From b2887d6964a406eb5f88f4ad4e9764c468954382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 12:06:17 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OpenSSL: Clear default_passwd_cb more thoroughly + +Previously, the pointer to strdup passwd was left in OpenSSL library +default_passwd_cb_userdata and even the default_passwd_cb was left set +on an error path. To avoid unexpected behavior if something were to +manage to use there pointers, clear them explicitly once done with +loading of the private key. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +(cherry picked from commit 89971d8b1e328a2f79699c953625d1671fd40384) +--- + src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +index bceb8c3..770af9e 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -2758,6 +2758,19 @@ static int tls_connection_engine_private_key(struct tls_connection *conn) + } + + ++static void tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL *ssl) ++{ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++ if (ssl) { ++ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl, NULL); ++ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl, NULL); ++ } ++#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ ++ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); ++ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, NULL); ++} ++ ++ + static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, + struct tls_connection *conn, + const char *private_key, +@@ -2874,14 +2887,12 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, + if (!ok) { + tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, + "Failed to load private key"); ++ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl); + os_free(passwd); + return -1; + } + ERR_clear_error(); +-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +- SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL); +-#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ +- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); ++ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl); + os_free(passwd); + + if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) { +@@ -2924,13 +2935,14 @@ static int tls_global_private_key(struct tls_data *data, + tls_read_pkcs12(data, NULL, private_key, passwd)) { + tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, + "Failed to load private key"); ++ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); + os_free(passwd); + ERR_clear_error(); + return -1; + } ++ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); + os_free(passwd); + ERR_clear_error(); +- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); + + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) { + tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, +-- +2.9.3 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0c03e1dc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From 290834df69556b903b49f2a45671cc62b44f13bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 17:59:30 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] nl80211: Fix race condition in detecting MAC change + +Commit 3e0272ca00ce1df35b45e7d739dd7e935f13fd84 ('nl80211: Re-read MAC +address on RTM_NEWLINK') added the detection of external changes to MAC +address when the interface is brought up. + +If the interface state is changed quickly enough, wpa_supplicant may +receive the netlink message for the !IFF_UP event when the interface +has already been brought up and would ignore the next netlink IFF_UP +message, missing the MAC change. + +Fix this by also reloading the MAC address when a !IFF_UP event is +received with the interface up, because this implies that the +interface went down and up again, possibly changing the address. + +Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> +--- + src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- + 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c +index af1cb84..24fad29 100644 +--- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c ++++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c +@@ -933,6 +933,30 @@ nl80211_find_drv(struct nl80211_global *global, int idx, u8 *buf, size_t len) + } + + ++static void nl80211_refresh_mac(struct wpa_driver_nl80211_data *drv, ++ int ifindex) ++{ ++ struct i802_bss *bss; ++ u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; ++ ++ bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifindex); ++ if (bss && ++ linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock, ++ bss->ifname, addr) < 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address", ++ bss->ifname); ++ } else if (bss && os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from " ++ MACSTR " to " MACSTR, ++ ifindex, bss->ifname, ++ MAC2STR(bss->addr), MAC2STR(addr)); ++ os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); ++ } ++} ++ ++ + static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, + struct ifinfomsg *ifi, + u8 *buf, size_t len) +@@ -997,6 +1021,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, + namebuf[0] = '\0'; + if (if_indextoname(ifi->ifi_index, namebuf) && + linux_iface_up(drv->global->ioctl_sock, namebuf) > 0) { ++ /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */ ++ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Ignore interface down " + "event since interface %s is up", namebuf); + drv->ignore_if_down_event = 0; +@@ -1044,27 +1070,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, + "event since interface %s is marked " + "removed", drv->first_bss->ifname); + } else { +- struct i802_bss *bss; +- u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; +- + /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */ +- bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifi->ifi_index); +- if (bss && +- linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock, +- bss->ifname, addr) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address", +- bss->ifname); +- } else if (bss && +- os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from " +- MACSTR " to " MACSTR, +- ifi->ifi_index, bss->ifname, +- MAC2STR(bss->addr), +- MAC2STR(addr)); +- os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); +- } ++ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index); + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Interface up"); + drv->if_disabled = 0; +-- +2.9.3 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d99be04c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From 0ad5893a2f1f521d44712cd395e067ccf0a397c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de> +Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 01:14:28 +0200 +Subject: PAE: Validate input before pointer + +ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() calls ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() +before body_len has been checked on all segments. + +ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() and ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() might +continue and thus underflow left_len even if it finds left_len to small +(or before checking). + +Additionally, ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body() might perform out of bound +reads in this case. + +Fix this by checking left_len and aborting if too small early. + +Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de> +--- + src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +index c4bfcbc..cad0292 100644 +--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c ++++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c +@@ -964,21 +964,19 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant, + body_len = get_mka_param_body_len(hdr); + body_type = get_mka_param_body_type(hdr); + +- if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST && +- body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST) +- continue; +- +- ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body( +- (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos); +- +- if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + body_len + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) { ++ if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len) + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, + "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV", + left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN, +- body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); +- continue; ++ MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len), ++ DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); ++ return FALSE; + } + ++ if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST && ++ body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST) ++ continue; ++ + if ((body_len % 16) != 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, + "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) should be a multiple of 16 octets", +@@ -986,6 +984,9 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant, + continue; + } + ++ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body( ++ (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos); ++ + for (i = 0; i < body_len; + i += sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id)) { + const struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id *peer_mi; +@@ -3018,7 +3019,7 @@ static int ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, + "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV", + left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN, + body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); +- continue; ++ return -1; + } + + if (handled[body_type]) +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc index a6b639789..b891fbbde 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc @@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ wpa_supplicant: component that is used in the client stations. It implements key wpa_supplicant: negotiation with a WPA Authenticator and it controls the roaming and wpa_supplicant: IEEE 802.11 authentication/association of the wlan driver. wpa_supplicant: -wpa_supplicant: Homepage: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ +wpa_supplicant: More info: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant: diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild index fa98162c8..d4e56cbbd 100755 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-1} +BUILD=${BUILD:-6} SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -) @@ -85,6 +85,15 @@ find . \ \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \ -exec chmod 644 {} \; +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 + # Fixup various paths in the dbus service file zcat $CWD/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 @@ -94,6 +103,11 @@ zcat $CWD/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || ex # Apply a few other patches from Fedora zcat $CWD/patches/assoc-timeout.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 zcat $CWD/patches/flush-debug-output.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + +# Support OpenSSL-1.1.x: +zcat $CWD/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 cd wpa_supplicant |