Thu Feb 20 23:40:12 UTC 202020200220234012

a/ed-1.16-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
l/gtk+3-3.24.14-x86_64-3.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Rebuilt to add wayland backend.
l/libuv-1.34.2-x86_64-1.txz:  Added.
  This is needed by bind-9.16.0.
l/qt5-5.13.2-x86_64-2.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Rebuilt to add wayland support.
  Use the system ffmpeg, not the bundled one.
n/bind-9.16.0-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
  rc.bind: don't change file ownerships in /var/named. Thanks to voegelas.
n/proftpd-1.3.6c-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
  No CVEs assigned, but this sure looks like a security issue:
  Use-after-free vulnerability in memory pools during data transfer.
  (* Security fix *)
x/libinput-1.15.2-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
x/xkbcomp-1.4.3-x86_64-1.txz:  Upgraded.
testing/packages/PAM/proftpd-1.3.6c-x86_64-1_pam.txz:  Upgraded.
  No CVEs assigned, but this sure looks like a security issue:
  Use-after-free vulnerability in memory pools during data transfer.
  (* Security fix *)

2 files changed, 13 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/source/n/bind/bind.SlackBuild b/source/n/bind/bind.SlackBuild
index e56100832..865a3d700 100755
--- a/source/n/bind/bind.SlackBuild
+++ b/source/n/bind/bind.SlackBuild
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@
 cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
 
 PKGNAM=bind
-VERSION=${VERSION:-9.14.10}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-2}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo ${PKGNAM}-[0-9]*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
 
 # Automatically determine the architecture we're building on:
 if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ fi
 
 cd $TMP
 rm -rf ${PKGNAM}-${VERSION}
-tar xvf $CWD/${PKGNAM}-$VERSION.tar.gz || exit 1
+tar xvf $CWD/${PKGNAM}-$VERSION.tar.?z || exit 1
 cd ${PKGNAM}-$VERSION || exit 1
 
 # Make sure ownerships and permissions are sane:
diff --git a/source/n/bind/rc.bind b/source/n/bind/rc.bind
index d58dc1e3e..91ff8ce14 100644
--- a/source/n/bind/rc.bind
+++ b/source/n/bind/rc.bind
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # Start/stop/restart the BIND name server daemon (named).
 
-# Start bind. In the past it was more secure to run BIND as a non-root
+# Start BIND. In the past it was more secure to run BIND as a non-root
 # user (for example, with '-u daemon'), but the modern version of BIND
 # knows how to use the kernel's capability mechanism to drop all root
 # privileges except the ability to bind() to a privileged port and set
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
 # can be set like this in /etc/default/named:
 #       NAMED_OPTIONS="-u daemon"
 # So you will not have to edit this script.
+#
+# Please note that if you run BIND as a non-root user, your files in
+# /var/named may need to be chowned to this user or else named will
+# refuse to start.
 
 # You might also consider running BIND in a "chroot jail",
 # a discussion of which may be found in
@@ -53,14 +57,15 @@ find_bind_user() {
 # running or you'll get more than one copy running.
 bind_start() {
   # If we are running as a non-root user, we'll need to be sure that
-  # /var/run/named exists, and /var/run/named and /var/named are
-  # chowned properly to that user:
+  # /var/run/named exists, and /var/run/named is chowned properly to
+  # that user. Your files in /var/named may need to be chowned as
+  # well, but that will be up to the sysadmin to do.
   BIND_USER="$(find_bind_user)"
   if [ ! "$BIND_USER" = "root" ]; then
     mkdir -p /var/run/named
-    chown -R $BIND_USER /var/run/named /var/named
+    chown -R $BIND_USER /var/run/named
   else # prevent error if switching back to running as root:
-    chown -R root /var/run/named /var/named
+    chown -R root /var/run/named
   fi
   if [ -x /usr/sbin/named ]; then
     echo "Starting BIND:  /usr/sbin/named $NAMED_OPTIONS"