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author Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com>2018-05-28 19:12:29 +0000
committer Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com>2018-05-31 23:39:35 +0200
commit646a5c1cbfd95873950a87b5f75d52073a967023 (patch)
treeb8b8d2ab3b0d432ea69ad1a64d1c789649d65020 /source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff
parentd31c50870d0bee042ce660e445c9294a59a3a65b (diff)
downloadcurrent-646a5c1cbfd95873950a87b5f75d52073a967023.tar.gz
current-646a5c1cbfd95873950a87b5f75d52073a967023.tar.xz
Mon May 28 19:12:29 UTC 201820180528191229
a/pkgtools-15.0-noarch-13.txz: Rebuilt. installpkg: default line length for --terselength is the number of columns. removepkg: added --terse mode. upgradepkg: default line length for --terselength is the number of columns. upgradepkg: accept -option in addition to --option. ap/vim-8.1.0026-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. d/bison-3.0.5-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. e/emacs-26.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. kde/kopete-4.14.3-x86_64-8.txz: Rebuilt. Recompiled against libidn-1.35. n/conntrack-tools-1.4.5-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/libnetfilter_conntrack-1.0.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/libnftnl-1.1.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/links-2.16-x86_64-2.txz: Rebuilt. Rebuilt to enable X driver for -g mode. n/lynx-2.8.9dev.19-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/nftables-0.8.5-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/p11-kit-0.23.11-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/ulogd-2.0.7-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. n/whois-5.3.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. xap/network-manager-applet-1.8.12-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. xap/vim-gvim-8.1.0026-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff')
-rw-r--r--source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff55
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff b/source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a5c44222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source/a/shadow/shadow.CVE-2017-2616.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+su: properly clear child PID
+
+If su is compiled with PAM support, it is possible for any local user
+to send SIGKILL to other processes with root privileges. There are
+only two conditions. First, the user must be able to perform su with
+a successful login. This does NOT have to be the root user, even using
+su with the same id is enough, e.g. "su $(whoami)". Second, SIGKILL
+can only be sent to processes which were executed after the su process.
+It is not possible to send SIGKILL to processes which were already
+running. I consider this as a security vulnerability, because I was
+able to write a proof of concept which unlocked a screen saver of
+another user this way.
+
+diff --git a/src/su.c b/src/su.c
+index f20d230..d86aa86 100644
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -379,11 +379,13 @@ static void prepare_pam_close_session (void)
+ /* wake child when resumed */
+ kill (pid, SIGCONT);
+ stop = false;
++ } else {
++ pid_child = 0;
+ }
+ } while (!stop);
+ }
+
+- if (0 != caught) {
++ if (0 != caught && 0 != pid_child) {
+ (void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
+ (void) fputs (_("Session terminated, terminating shell..."),
+ stderr);
+@@ -393,9 +395,22 @@ static void prepare_pam_close_session (void)
+ snprintf (wait_msg, sizeof wait_msg, _(" ...waiting for child to terminate.\n"));
+
+ (void) signal (SIGALRM, kill_child);
++ (void) signal (SIGCHLD, catch_signals);
+ (void) alarm (2);
+
+- (void) wait (&status);
++ sigemptyset (&ourset);
++ if ((sigaddset (&ourset, SIGALRM) != 0)
++ || (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0)) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"), Prog);
++ kill_child (0);
++ } else {
++ while (0 == waitpid (pid_child, &status, WNOHANG)) {
++ sigsuspend (&ourset);
++ }
++ pid_child = 0;
++ (void) sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL);
++ }
++
+ (void) fputs (_(" ...terminated.\n"), stderr);
+ }