Wed Dec 14 21:19:34 UTC 202220221214211934_15.0

patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz:  Upgraded.
  This update contains security fixes and improvements.
  For more information, see:
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/102.6.0/releasenotes/
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2022-52/
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46880
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46872
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46881
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46874
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46875
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46882
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46878
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz:  Upgraded.
  This release contains security fixes and improvements.
  For more information, see:
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/102.6.0/releasenotes/
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2022-53/
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46880
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46872
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46881
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46874
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46875
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46882
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46878
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This release fixes 6 recently reported security vulnerabilities in
  various extensions.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2022-December/003302.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46340
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46341
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46342
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46343
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46344
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-4283
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This release fixes 6 recently reported security vulnerabilities in
  various extensions.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2022-December/003302.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46340
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46341
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46342
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46343
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46344
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-4283
  (* Security fix *)

22 files changed, 738 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.5.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
index 9d8594319..9d8594319 100644
--- a/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.5.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.5.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
index 5acb7b92e..5acb7b92e 100644
--- a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.5.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
index ec0248ea9..ec0248ea9 100644
--- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
index 2ffb35f60..2ffb35f60 100644
--- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
index 9c7075278..9c7075278 100644
--- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
index 675c628db..675c628db 100644
--- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-3_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
index 44e18f2cf..44e18f2cf 100644
--- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-3_slack15.0.txt
+++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88dfea0af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it
+
+Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
+reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
+already freed memory.
+
+CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
+         }
+         else {
+             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
++            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
+         }
+         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9bf7bc9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
+sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
+However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
+so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
+misparsed.
+
+Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
+xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
+swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
+
+Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
+Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
+doesn't support GenericEvent.
+
+CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
+index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644
+--- a/Xext/xtest.c
++++ b/Xext/xtest.c
+@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
+ 
+     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
+     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
++        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
+         /* Swap event */
+-        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
++        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
+         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+-        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
++        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
+             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
+             return BadValue;
+         }
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d68fad74d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
+
+The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
+255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
+to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
+anyway.
+
+This fixes an OOB write:
+
+ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
+temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
+For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
+stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
+representing stuff->detail cleared.
+
+However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
+thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
+
+CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644
+--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
++     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
++     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255)
++        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
++
+     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
+                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
+         return BadValue;
+@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
+-            /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
+-             * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
+-             * cannot work anyway */
+-            if (stuff->detail > 255)
+-                status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
+-            else
+-                status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
+-                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
++            status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
++                             &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeEnter:
+         case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
+@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
++        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
++        return BadValue;
++    }
++
+     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
+     if (rc != Success)
+         return rc;
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c64a0fbff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same
+ client
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
+TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
+is added twice to the resources:
+  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
+    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
+  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
+
+The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
+client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
+all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
+the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
+and free the whole list.
+
+However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
+same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
+existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
+client's resources.
+
+If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
+- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
+for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
+a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
+
+Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
+setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
+resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
+again when the client quits.
+
+Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
+clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
+
+CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
+index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644
+--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
+@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
+         tpn = pn;
+         while (tpn) {
+             if (tpn->client == client) {
+-                if (!onoff)
++                if (!onoff) {
+                     tpn->client = NULL;
++                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
++                }
+                 return Success;
+             }
+             if (!tpn->client)
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f2d0259b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
+ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
+resources.
+
+When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
+struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
+old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
+ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
+
+Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
+
+CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
+index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644
+--- a/Xext/saver.c
++++ b/Xext/saver.c
+@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
+         pVlist++;
+     }
+     if (pPriv->attr)
+-        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
++        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
+     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
+     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
+     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..966a9cb0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcXIChangeProperty
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
+so let's fix that too.
+
+CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int rc;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+     int rc;
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     unsigned long len;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
+diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
+index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644
+--- a/dix/property.c
++++ b/dix/property.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     WindowPtr pWin;
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
++    int sizeInBytes, err;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
index 8be825f3c..3a44fac64 100755
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
 PKGNAM=xorg-server-xwayland
 SRCNAM=xwayland
 VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $SRCNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-3_slack15.0}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-4_slack15.0}
 
 # Default font paths to be used by the X server:
 DEF_FONTPATH="/usr/share/fonts/misc,/usr/share/fonts/local,/usr/share/fonts/TTF,/usr/share/fonts/OTF,/usr/share/fonts/Type1,/usr/share/fonts/CID,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi,/usr/share/fonts/cyrillic"
@@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ zcat $CWD/0003-6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42.patch.gz | patch -p1 --v
 zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-3550.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-3551.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 
+# Patch more security issues:
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-4283.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46340.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46341.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46342.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46343.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46344.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
 # Configure, build, and install:
 export CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
 export CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
index 56dc1348a..8dbf9c840 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
@@ -1 +1 @@
-4_slack15.0
+5_slack15.0
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
index 770ff67d4..78dbc965a 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
@@ -38,3 +38,11 @@ zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/0003-6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42.patch.
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3550.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3551.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3553.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+
+# Patch some more security issues:
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88dfea0af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it
+
+Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
+reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
+already freed memory.
+
+CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
+         }
+         else {
+             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
++            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
+         }
+         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9bf7bc9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
+sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
+However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
+so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
+misparsed.
+
+Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
+xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
+swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
+
+Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
+Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
+doesn't support GenericEvent.
+
+CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
+index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644
+--- a/Xext/xtest.c
++++ b/Xext/xtest.c
+@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
+ 
+     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
+     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
++        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
+         /* Swap event */
+-        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
++        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
+         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+-        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
++        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
+             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
+             return BadValue;
+         }
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d68fad74d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
+
+The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
+255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
+to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
+anyway.
+
+This fixes an OOB write:
+
+ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
+temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
+For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
+stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
+representing stuff->detail cleared.
+
+However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
+thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
+
+CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644
+--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
++     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
++     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255)
++        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
++
+     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
+                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
+         return BadValue;
+@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
+-            /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
+-             * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
+-             * cannot work anyway */
+-            if (stuff->detail > 255)
+-                status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
+-            else
+-                status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
+-                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
++            status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
++                             &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeEnter:
+         case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
+@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
++        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
++        return BadValue;
++    }
++
+     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
+     if (rc != Success)
+         return rc;
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c64a0fbff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same
+ client
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
+TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
+is added twice to the resources:
+  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
+    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
+  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
+
+The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
+client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
+all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
+the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
+and free the whole list.
+
+However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
+same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
+existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
+client's resources.
+
+If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
+- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
+for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
+a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
+
+Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
+setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
+resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
+again when the client quits.
+
+Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
+clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
+
+CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
+index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644
+--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
+@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
+         tpn = pn;
+         while (tpn) {
+             if (tpn->client == client) {
+-                if (!onoff)
++                if (!onoff) {
+                     tpn->client = NULL;
++                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
++                }
+                 return Success;
+             }
+             if (!tpn->client)
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f2d0259b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
+ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
+resources.
+
+When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
+struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
+old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
+ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
+
+Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
+
+CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
+index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644
+--- a/Xext/saver.c
++++ b/Xext/saver.c
+@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
+         pVlist++;
+     }
+     if (pPriv->attr)
+-        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
++        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
+     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
+     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
+     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..966a9cb0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcXIChangeProperty
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
+so let's fix that too.
+
+CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int rc;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+     int rc;
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     unsigned long len;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
+diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
+index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644
+--- a/dix/property.c
++++ b/dix/property.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     WindowPtr pWin;
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
++    int sizeInBytes, err;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+