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author Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com>2018-05-25 23:29:36 +0000
committer Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com>2018-05-31 15:18:32 -0700
commit8ff4f2f51a6cf07fc33742ce3bee81328896e49b (patch)
tree4a166b8389404be98a6c098babaa444e2dec8f48 /patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
parent76fc4757ac91ac7947a01fb7b53dddf9a78a01d1 (diff)
downloadcurrent-14.1.tar.gz
current-14.1.tar.xz
Fri May 25 23:29:36 UTC 201814.1
patches/packages/glibc-zoneinfo-2018e-noarch-2_slack14.1.txz: Rebuilt. Handle removal of US/Pacific-New timezone. If we see that the machine is using this, it will be automatically switched to US/Pacific.
Diffstat (limited to 'patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch')
-rw-r--r--patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch41
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..483bd74f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/0001-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 2ecba31ddb5f4b953a0a811fec7fb7470b668f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 18:54:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 01/31] unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash
+ Xserver [CVE-2014-8091]
+
+authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the
+connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order
+to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted.
+
+It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly
+allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server
+fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len
+field is a CARD16 in the X protocol).
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ os/rpcauth.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/os/rpcauth.c b/os/rpcauth.c
+index bd219ac..c5bf787 100644
+--- a/os/rpcauth.c
++++ b/os/rpcauth.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ authdes_ezdecode(const char *inmsg, int len)
+ SVCXPRT xprt;
+
+ temp_inmsg = malloc(len);
++ if (temp_inmsg == NULL) {
++ why = AUTH_FAILED; /* generic error, since there is no AUTH_BADALLOC */
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ memmove(temp_inmsg, inmsg, len);
+
+ memset((char *) &msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+--
+1.9.3
+