blob: 9688802e0cd9654ed63646c8c4d00c836889ecd6 (
plain) (
tree)
|
|
From 26ef0a52797e8c3acd00c7a2bcb272abae73ca5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:40:18 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 06/31] dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers()
[CVE-2014-8094]
ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count).
There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause
out of bound reads and memory corruption later on.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
---
hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
index 4ab0186..c3dbb2f 100644
--- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
+++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client)
unsigned int *attachments;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4);
+ if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess,
&pDrawable, &status))
return status;
--
1.9.3
|