diff options
author | Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2023-10-26 19:55:16 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2023-10-27 13:30:41 +0200 |
commit | 61c8c898a8436669b6097c597b659179846435fd (patch) | |
tree | e355d0b039710281cf69d95a5e03706786411598 /patches | |
parent | 6f3fcdc1d32a533cdff7d225ac8c1ad8a10eb19c (diff) | |
download | current-61c8c898a8436669b6097c597b659179846435fd.tar.gz current-61c8c898a8436669b6097c597b659179846435fd.tar.xz |
Thu Oct 26 19:55:16 UTC 202320231026195516_15.0
patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz: Upgraded.
This release contains security fixes and improvements.
For more information, see:
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/115.4.1/releasenotes/
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2023-47/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5721
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5732
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5724
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5725
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5726
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5727
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5728
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5730
(* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
This update fixes security issues:
OOB write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty.
Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow.
For more information, see:
https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-October/003430.html
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5367
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5380
(* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
This update fixes a security issue:
OOB write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty.
For more information, see:
https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-October/003430.html
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5367
(* Security fix *)
Diffstat (limited to 'patches')
12 files changed, 272 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt index 5acb7b92e..5acb7b92e 100644 --- a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt index ec0248ea9..ec0248ea9 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt index 2ffb35f60..2ffb35f60 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt index 9c7075278..9c7075278 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt index 675c628db..675c628db 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-7_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt index 44e18f2cf..44e18f2cf 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-7_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aef25e917 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend + +The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at +least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new +part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P +existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements +instead of N + P. + +Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old +values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially +uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. +For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would +result in this 8 value array: + [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P + ^OOB write + +The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in +both. + +CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +-- +GitLab + + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild index 7d7d88d20..16b56263b 100755 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/bash -# Copyright 2016, 2018, 2019 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA +# Copyright 2016, 2018, 2019, 2023 Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=xorg-server-xwayland SRCNAM=xwayland VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $SRCNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-7_slack15.0} +BUILD=${BUILD:-8_slack15.0} # Default font paths to be used by the X server: DEF_FONTPATH="/usr/share/fonts/misc,/usr/share/fonts/local,/usr/share/fonts/TTF,/usr/share/fonts/OTF,/usr/share/fonts/Type1,/usr/share/fonts/CID,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi,/usr/share/fonts/cyrillic" @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 # This prevents a crash with recent NVIDIA drivers. zcat $CWD/857.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +# Patch another security issue: +zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + # Configure, build, and install: export CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" export CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server index 05965f95a..7970fef66 100644 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server @@ -1 +1 @@ -8_slack15.0 +9_slack15.0 diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch index e95f8b86f..a9dc46a2f 100644 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch @@ -59,3 +59,8 @@ zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/857.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLAC # Patch another security issue: zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } + +# Patch more security issues: +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aef25e917 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend + +The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at +least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new +part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P +existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements +instead of N + P. + +Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old +values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially +uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. +For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would +result in this 8 value array: + [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P + ^OOB write + +The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in +both. + +CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +-- +GitLab + + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a358076dc --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From 564ccf2ce9616620456102727acb8b0256b7bbd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen switch + +PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite +entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion(). + +If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our +dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window. +If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will +trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips +that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for +the device still refers to the previous window. + +If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will +eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy +later. + +To trigger this, we require: +- two protocol screens +- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window +- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window + +This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the +PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This +doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't +either. + +CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +--- + dix/enterleave.h | 2 -- + include/eventstr.h | 3 +++ + mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h +index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.h ++++ b/dix/enterleave.h +@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, + + extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode); + +-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); +- + extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd, + int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin); + +diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h +index 93308f9b24..a9926eaeef 100644 +--- a/include/eventstr.h ++++ b/include/eventstr.h +@@ -335,4 +335,7 @@ union _InternalEvent { + GestureEvent gesture_event; + }; + ++extern void ++LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); ++ + #endif +diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c +index a638f25d4a..8cf0035140 100644 +--- a/mi/mipointer.c ++++ b/mi/mipointer.c +@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y) + #ifdef PANORAMIX + && noPanoramiXExtension + #endif +- ) +- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ ) { ++ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER); ++ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving ++ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the ++ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF ++ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window ++ * to the root window on the other screen. ++ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but ++ * too niche to fix. ++ */ ++ LeaveWindow(pDev); ++ if (master) ++ LeaveWindow(master); ++ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ } + } + + /** +-- +GitLab + +B |