diff options
author | Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2022-12-14 21:19:34 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2022-12-15 13:30:52 +0100 |
commit | b5eac9957be4752168e21dd2ff7c280a05d7e76f (patch) | |
tree | e02efd5ab8b168a3bc78aeac3798710cba30499e /patches | |
parent | 012399c1c57f63fd382b8dd5093aef9800eaff4a (diff) | |
download | current-b5eac9957be4752168e21dd2ff7c280a05d7e76f.tar.gz current-b5eac9957be4752168e21dd2ff7c280a05d7e76f.tar.xz |
Wed Dec 14 21:19:34 UTC 202220221214211934_15.0
patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz: Upgraded.
This update contains security fixes and improvements.
For more information, see:
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/102.6.0/releasenotes/
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2022-52/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46880
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46872
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46881
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46874
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46875
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46882
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46878
(* Security fix *)
patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz: Upgraded.
This release contains security fixes and improvements.
For more information, see:
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/102.6.0/releasenotes/
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2022-53/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46880
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46872
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46881
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46874
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46875
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46882
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46878
(* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
This release fixes 6 recently reported security vulnerabilities in
various extensions.
For more information, see:
https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2022-December/003302.html
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46340
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46341
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46342
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46343
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46344
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-4283
(* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
This release fixes 6 recently reported security vulnerabilities in
various extensions.
For more information, see:
https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2022-December/003302.html
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46340
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46341
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46342
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46343
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-46344
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-4283
(* Security fix *)
Diffstat (limited to 'patches')
22 files changed, 738 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.5.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt index 9d8594319..9d8594319 100644 --- a/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.5.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/mozilla-firefox-102.6.0esr-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.5.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt index 5acb7b92e..5acb7b92e 100644 --- a/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.5.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-102.6.0-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt index ec0248ea9..ec0248ea9 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt index 2ffb35f60..2ffb35f60 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt index 9c7075278..9c7075278 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt index 675c628db..675c628db 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-3_slack15.0.txt b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt index 44e18f2cf..44e18f2cf 100644 --- a/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-3_slack15.0.txt +++ b/patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88dfea0af --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-4283.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it + +Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not +reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access +already freed memory. + +CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst) + } + else { + free(dst->names->radio_groups); ++ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL; + } + dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg; + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c9bf7bc9f --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46340.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput + +XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are +sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments. +However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes, +so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be +misparsed. + +Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct +xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes, +swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast. + +Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent. +Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest +doesn't support GenericEvent. + +CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c +index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644 +--- a/Xext/xtest.c ++++ b/Xext/xtest.c +@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) + + nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); + for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { ++ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; + /* Swap event */ +- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177]; ++ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; + /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ +- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) { ++ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) { + client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type; + return BadValue; + } +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d68fad74d --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46341.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 + +The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above +255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche +to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero +anyway. + +This fixes an OOB write: + +ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a +temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail. +For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the +stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit +representing stuff->detail cleared. + +However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits, +thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write. + +CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644 +--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c ++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never ++ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that ++ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) ++ return XIAlreadyGrabbed; ++ + if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], + stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success) + return BadValue; +@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeKeycode: +- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never +- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that +- * cannot work anyway */ +- if (stuff->detail > 255) +- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed; +- else +- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, +- ¶m, XI2, &mask); ++ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, ++ ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeEnter: + case XIGrabtypeFocusIn: +@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) { ++ client->errorValue = stuff->detail; ++ return BadValue; ++ } ++ + rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess); + if (rc != Success) + return rc; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c64a0fbff --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46342.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same + client + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a +TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct +is added twice to the resources: + - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per + drawable, subsequent calls append to this list. + - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client. + +The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a +client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove +all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting +the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove +and free the whole list. + +However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the +same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the +existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the +client's resources. + +If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable +- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource +for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL. + +Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On +a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon. + +Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely +setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client +resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed +again when the client quits. + +Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for +clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify. + +CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c +index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644 +--- a/Xext/xvmain.c ++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c +@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff) + tpn = pn; + while (tpn) { + if (tpn->client == client) { +- if (!onoff) ++ if (!onoff) { + tpn->client = NULL; ++ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify); ++ } + return Success; + } + if (!tpn->client) +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f2d0259b --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46343.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct +ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's +resources. + +When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new +struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The +old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources. + +Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes +ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct. + +Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead. + +CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/saver.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c +index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644 +--- a/Xext/saver.c ++++ b/Xext/saver.c +@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client) + pVlist++; + } + if (pPriv->attr) +- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr); ++ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType); + pPriv->attr = pAttr; + pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index); + if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr)) +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..966a9cb0e --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2022-46344.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcXIChangeProperty + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, +so let's fix that too. + +CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + dix/property.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) + REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); + DeviceIntPtr dev; + unsigned long len; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int rc; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); +@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + { + int rc; + DeviceIntPtr dev; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + unsigned long len; + + REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq); +diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c +index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644 +--- a/dix/property.c ++++ b/dix/property.c +@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + WindowPtr pWin; + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; +- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err; ++ int sizeInBytes, err; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + + REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq); + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild index 8be825f3c..3a44fac64 100755 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=xorg-server-xwayland SRCNAM=xwayland VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $SRCNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-3_slack15.0} +BUILD=${BUILD:-4_slack15.0} # Default font paths to be used by the X server: DEF_FONTPATH="/usr/share/fonts/misc,/usr/share/fonts/local,/usr/share/fonts/TTF,/usr/share/fonts/OTF,/usr/share/fonts/Type1,/usr/share/fonts/CID,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi,/usr/share/fonts/cyrillic" @@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ zcat $CWD/0003-6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42.patch.gz | patch -p1 --v zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-3550.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-3551.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +# Patch more security issues: +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-4283.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46340.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46341.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46342.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46343.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/CVE-2022-46344.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + # Configure, build, and install: export CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" export CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server index 56dc1348a..8dbf9c840 100644 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server @@ -1 +1 @@ -4_slack15.0 +5_slack15.0 diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch index 770ff67d4..78dbc965a 100644 --- a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch @@ -38,3 +38,11 @@ zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/0003-6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42.patch. zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3550.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3551.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3553.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } + +# Patch some more security issues: +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } +zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; } diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88dfea0af --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it + +Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not +reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access +already freed memory. + +CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c +@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst) + } + else { + free(dst->names->radio_groups); ++ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL; + } + dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg; + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c9bf7bc9f --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput + +XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are +sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments. +However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes, +so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be +misparsed. + +Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct +xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes, +swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast. + +Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent. +Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest +doesn't support GenericEvent. + +CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c +index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644 +--- a/Xext/xtest.c ++++ b/Xext/xtest.c +@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) + + nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); + for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { ++ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; + /* Swap event */ +- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177]; ++ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; + /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ +- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) { ++ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) { + client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type; + return BadValue; + } +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d68fad74d --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 + +The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above +255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche +to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero +anyway. + +This fixes an OOB write: + +ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a +temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail. +For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the +stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit +representing stuff->detail cleared. + +However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits, +thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write. + +CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644 +--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c ++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never ++ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that ++ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) ++ return XIAlreadyGrabbed; ++ + if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], + stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success) + return BadValue; +@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeKeycode: +- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never +- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that +- * cannot work anyway */ +- if (stuff->detail > 255) +- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed; +- else +- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, +- ¶m, XI2, &mask); ++ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, ++ ¶m, XI2, &mask); + break; + case XIGrabtypeEnter: + case XIGrabtypeFocusIn: +@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + return BadValue; + } + ++ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */ ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) { ++ client->errorValue = stuff->detail; ++ return BadValue; ++ } ++ + rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess); + if (rc != Success) + return rc; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c64a0fbff --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same + client + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a +TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct +is added twice to the resources: + - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per + drawable, subsequent calls append to this list. + - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client. + +The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a +client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove +all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting +the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove +and free the whole list. + +However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the +same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the +existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the +client's resources. + +If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable +- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource +for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL. + +Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On +a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon. + +Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely +setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client +resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed +again when the client quits. + +Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for +clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify. + +CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c +index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644 +--- a/Xext/xvmain.c ++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c +@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff) + tpn = pn; + while (tpn) { + if (tpn->client == client) { +- if (!onoff) ++ if (!onoff) { + tpn->client = NULL; ++ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify); ++ } + return Success; + } + if (!tpn->client) +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3f2d0259b --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it + +This fixes a use-after-free bug: + +When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct +ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's +resources. + +When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new +struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The +old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources. + +Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes +ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct. + +Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead. + +CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xext/saver.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c +index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644 +--- a/Xext/saver.c ++++ b/Xext/saver.c +@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client) + pVlist++; + } + if (pPriv->attr) +- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr); ++ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType); + pPriv->attr = pAttr; + pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index); + if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr)) +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..966a9cb0e --- /dev/null +++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcXIChangeProperty + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, +so let's fix that too. + +CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + dix/property.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) + REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); + DeviceIntPtr dev; + unsigned long len; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int rc; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); +@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + { + int rc; + DeviceIntPtr dev; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + unsigned long len; + + REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq); +diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c +index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644 +--- a/dix/property.c ++++ b/dix/property.c +@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) + WindowPtr pWin; + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; +- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err; ++ int sizeInBytes, err; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + + REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq); + +-- +GitLab + |