Thu Oct 26 19:55:16 UTC 202320231026195516_15.0

patches/packages/mozilla-thunderbird-115.4.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz:  Upgraded.
  This release contains security fixes and improvements.
  For more information, see:
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/115.4.1/releasenotes/
    https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2023-47/
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5721
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5732
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5724
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5725
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5726
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5727
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5728
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5730
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This update fixes security issues:
  OOB write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty.
  Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-October/003430.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5367
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5380
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-8_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This update fixes a security issue:
  OOB write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-October/003430.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5367
  (* Security fix *)

6 files changed, 272 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aef25e917
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-5367.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
+
+The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
+least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
+part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
+existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
+instead of N + P.
+
+Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
+values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
+uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
+For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
+result in this 8 value array:
+  [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
+                            ^OOB write
+
+The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
+both.
+
+CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c    | 4 ++--
+ randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+                 XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
+             return BadAlloc;
+         }
+-        new_value.size = len;
++        new_value.size = total_len;
+         new_value.type = type;
+         new_value.format = format;
+ 
+@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+         case PropModePrepend:
+             new_data = new_value.data;
+             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+-                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
+             break;
+         }
+         if (new_data)
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+                 RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
+             return BadAlloc;
+         }
+-        new_value.size = len;
++        new_value.size = total_len;
+         new_value.type = type;
+         new_value.format = format;
+ 
+@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+         case PropModePrepend:
+             new_data = new_value.data;
+             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+-                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
+             break;
+         }
+         if (new_data)
+-- 
+GitLab
+
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
index 7d7d88d20..16b56263b 100755
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 
-# Copyright 2016, 2018, 2019  Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA
+# Copyright 2016, 2018, 2019, 2023  Patrick J. Volkerding, Sebeka, MN, USA
 # All rights reserved.
 #
 # Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
 PKGNAM=xorg-server-xwayland
 SRCNAM=xwayland
 VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $SRCNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-7_slack15.0}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-8_slack15.0}
 
 # Default font paths to be used by the X server:
 DEF_FONTPATH="/usr/share/fonts/misc,/usr/share/fonts/local,/usr/share/fonts/TTF,/usr/share/fonts/OTF,/usr/share/fonts/Type1,/usr/share/fonts/CID,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi,/usr/share/fonts/cyrillic"
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 # This prevents a crash with recent NVIDIA drivers.
 zcat $CWD/857.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 
+# Patch another security issue:
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
 # Configure, build, and install:
 export CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
 export CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
index 05965f95a..7970fef66 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
@@ -1 +1 @@
-8_slack15.0
+9_slack15.0
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
index e95f8b86f..a9dc46a2f 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
@@ -59,3 +59,8 @@ zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/857.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLAC
 
 # Patch another security issue:
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+
+# Patch more security issues:
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aef25e917
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
+
+The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
+least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
+part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
+existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
+instead of N + P.
+
+Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
+values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
+uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
+For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
+result in this 8 value array:
+  [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
+                            ^OOB write
+
+The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
+both.
+
+CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c    | 4 ++--
+ randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+                 XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
+             return BadAlloc;
+         }
+-        new_value.size = len;
++        new_value.size = total_len;
+         new_value.type = type;
+         new_value.format = format;
+ 
+@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+         case PropModePrepend:
+             new_data = new_value.data;
+             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+-                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
+             break;
+         }
+         if (new_data)
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+                 RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
+             return BadAlloc;
+         }
+-        new_value.size = len;
++        new_value.size = total_len;
+         new_value.type = type;
+         new_value.format = format;
+ 
+@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+         case PropModePrepend:
+             new_data = new_value.data;
+             old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+-                                  (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++                                  (len * size_in_bytes));
+             break;
+         }
+         if (new_data)
+-- 
+GitLab
+
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a358076dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 564ccf2ce9616620456102727acb8b0256b7bbd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen switch
+
+PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
+entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
+
+If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
+dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
+If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
+trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
+that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
+the device still refers to the previous window.
+
+If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
+eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
+later.
+
+To trigger this, we require:
+- two protocol screens
+- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
+- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
+
+This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
+PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
+doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
+either.
+
+CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.h   |  2 --
+ include/eventstr.h |  3 +++
+ mi/mipointer.c     | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h
+index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.h
++++ b/dix/enterleave.h
+@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev,
+ 
+ extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode);
+ 
+-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
+-
+ extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd,
+                            int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin);
+ 
+diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h
+index 93308f9b24..a9926eaeef 100644
+--- a/include/eventstr.h
++++ b/include/eventstr.h
+@@ -335,4 +335,7 @@ union _InternalEvent {
+     GestureEvent gesture_event;
+ };
+ 
++extern void
++LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c
+index a638f25d4a..8cf0035140 100644
+--- a/mi/mipointer.c
++++ b/mi/mipointer.c
+@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y)
+ #ifdef PANORAMIX
+         && noPanoramiXExtension
+ #endif
+-        )
+-        UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
++        ) {
++            DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER);
++            /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving
++             * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the
++             * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF
++             * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window
++             * to the root window on the other screen.
++             * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but
++             * too niche to fix.
++             */
++            LeaveWindow(pDev);
++            if (master)
++                LeaveWindow(master);
++            UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+-- 
+GitLab
+
+B