Wed Dec 13 22:01:34 UTC 202320231213220134_15.0

patches/packages/libxml2-2.12.3-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz:  Upgraded.
  This update addresses regressions when building against libxml2 that were
  due to header file refactoring.
patches/packages/xorg-server-1.20.14-x86_64-10_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This update fixes two security issues:
  Out-of-bounds memory write in XKB button actions.
  Out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and
  RRChangeProviderProperty.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2023-December/061517.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6377
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6478
  (* Security fix *)
patches/packages/xorg-server-xephyr-1.20.14-x86_64-10_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xnest-1.20.14-x86_64-10_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xvfb-1.20.14-x86_64-10_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
patches/packages/xorg-server-xwayland-21.1.4-x86_64-9_slack15.0.txz:  Rebuilt.
  This update fixes two security issues:
  Out-of-bounds memory write in XKB button actions.
  Out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and
  RRChangeProviderProperty.
  For more information, see:
    https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg/2023-December/061517.html
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6377
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6478
  (* Security fix *)

7 files changed, 277 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6377.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6377.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4e2fca615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6377.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
+
+button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
+our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
+insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
+XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
+leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
+
+CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
+ dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+         }
+ 
+         if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
+-            if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
+-                to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
+-                if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
+-                    FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
+-            }
++            size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
++            to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                   maxbuttons,
++                                                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
+-                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++                   from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+         }
+         else {
+             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+ 
+     if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
+         int i;
++        int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
++
+         DeviceChangedEvent event = {
+             .header = ET_Internal,
+             .type = ET_DeviceChanged,
+@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+         };
+ 
+         master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
++        if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
++            master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                       maxbuttons,
++                                                       sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
++                   0,
++                   (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
++        }
+ 
+         memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
+                sizeof(Atom));
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6478.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6478.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed2044c7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/CVE-2023-6478.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcRRChange*Property
+
+Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
+See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
+protocol and XI.
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+---
+ randr/rrproperty.c         | 2 +-
+ randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
+diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
index 16b56263b..fe617accc 100755
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server-xwayland/xorg-server-xwayland.SlackBuild
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd)
 PKGNAM=xorg-server-xwayland
 SRCNAM=xwayland
 VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $SRCNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-8_slack15.0}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-9_slack15.0}
 
 # Default font paths to be used by the X server:
 DEF_FONTPATH="/usr/share/fonts/misc,/usr/share/fonts/local,/usr/share/fonts/TTF,/usr/share/fonts/OTF,/usr/share/fonts/Type1,/usr/share/fonts/CID,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi/:unscaled,/usr/share/fonts/75dpi,/usr/share/fonts/100dpi,/usr/share/fonts/cyrillic"
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ zcat $CWD/857.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 # Patch another security issue:
 zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
 
+# Patch more security issues:
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-6377.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+zcat $CWD/CVE-2023-6478.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1
+
 # Configure, build, and install:
 export CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
 export CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS"
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
index 7970fef66..92794e1d7 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/build/xorg-server
@@ -1 +1 @@
-9_slack15.0
+10_slack15.0
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
index a9dc46a2f..fa924f1f7 100644
--- a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server.patch
@@ -64,3 +64,6 @@ zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { to
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
 zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
 
+# Patch more security issues:
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
+zcat $CWD/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || { touch ${SLACK_X_BUILD_DIR}/${PKGNAME}.failed ; continue ; }
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4e2fca615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
+
+button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
+our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
+insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
+XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
+leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
+
+CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
+ dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+         }
+ 
+         if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
+-            if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
+-                to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
+-                if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
+-                    FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
+-            }
++            size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
++            to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                   maxbuttons,
++                                                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
+-                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++                   from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+         }
+         else {
+             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+ 
+     if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
+         int i;
++        int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
++
+         DeviceChangedEvent event = {
+             .header = ET_Internal,
+             .type = ET_DeviceChanged,
+@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+         };
+ 
+         master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
++        if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
++            master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                       maxbuttons,
++                                                       sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
++                   0,
++                   (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
++        }
+ 
+         memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
+                sizeof(Atom));
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed2044c7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xorg-server/patch/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcRRChange*Property
+
+Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
+See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
+protocol and XI.
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+---
+ randr/rrproperty.c         | 2 +-
+ randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
+diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
+-- 
+GitLab
+