diff options
author | Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2024-01-21 20:50:08 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2024-01-22 13:30:35 +0100 |
commit | 4e883273037a35e5e60bbbb34c2e8720dba2711f (patch) | |
tree | 11c2a4dfd229868bad285ff3ff4bab76f525ffec | |
parent | 0a8de80c8a0d329636b02c3c2b80d949a9070224 (diff) | |
download | current-4e883273037a35e5e60bbbb34c2e8720dba2711f.tar.gz current-4e883273037a35e5e60bbbb34c2e8720dba2711f.tar.xz |
Sun Jan 21 20:50:08 UTC 202420240121205008_15.0
extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt.
Recompiled against xorg-server-1.20.14, including the latest patches for
several security issues. Thanks to marav.
For more information, see:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6377
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6478
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6816
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0229
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0408
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0409
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21885
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886
(* Security fix *)
-rw-r--r-- | ChangeLog.rss | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ChangeLog.txt | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | FILELIST.TXT | 171 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch | 75 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch | 83 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch | 217 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch | 37 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch | 60 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch | 56 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch | 109 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch | 70 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch | 53 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild | 13 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | recompress.sh | 11 |
16 files changed, 1026 insertions, 83 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog.rss b/ChangeLog.rss index d9a134a4a..c7280349a 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.rss +++ b/ChangeLog.rss @@ -11,10 +11,34 @@ <description>Tracking Slackware development in git.</description> <language>en-us</language> <id xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">urn:uuid:c964f45e-6732-11e8-bbe5-107b4450212f</id> - <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2024 21:13:27 GMT</pubDate> - <lastBuildDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:38:57 GMT</lastBuildDate> + <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 2024 20:50:08 GMT</pubDate> + <lastBuildDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2024 12:30:21 GMT</lastBuildDate> <generator>maintain_current_git.sh v 1.17</generator> <item> + <title>Sun, 21 Jan 2024 20:50:08 GMT</title> + <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 2024 20:50:08 GMT</pubDate> + <link>https://git.slackware.nl/current/tag/?h=20240121205008</link> + <guid isPermaLink="false">20240121205008</guid> + <description> + <![CDATA[<pre> +extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt. + Recompiled against xorg-server-1.20.14, including the latest patches for + several security issues. Thanks to marav. + For more information, see: + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6377 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6478 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6816 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0229 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0408 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0409 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21885 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886 + (* Security fix *) + </pre>]]> + </description> + </item> + <item> <title>Wed, 17 Jan 2024 21:13:27 GMT</title> <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2024 21:13:27 GMT</pubDate> <link>https://git.slackware.nl/current/tag/?h=20240117211327</link> diff --git a/ChangeLog.txt b/ChangeLog.txt index d30fbff40..ace4cd217 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.txt @@ -1,3 +1,19 @@ +Sun Jan 21 20:50:08 UTC 2024 +extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz: Rebuilt. + Recompiled against xorg-server-1.20.14, including the latest patches for + several security issues. Thanks to marav. + For more information, see: + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6377 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6478 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-6816 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0229 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0408 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-0409 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21885 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886 + https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-21886 + (* Security fix *) ++--------------------------+ Wed Jan 17 21:13:27 UTC 2024 patches/packages/seamonkey-2.53.18.1-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz: Upgraded. This is a bugfix release. diff --git a/FILELIST.TXT b/FILELIST.TXT index 3f3c2a319..8e869e8ce 100644 --- a/FILELIST.TXT +++ b/FILELIST.TXT @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ -Wed Jan 17 21:16:44 UTC 2024 +Sun Jan 21 20:58:21 UTC 2024 Here is the file list for this directory. If you are using a mirror site and find missing or extra files in the disk subdirectories, please have the archive administrator refresh the mirror. -drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 2024-01-17 21:13 . +drwxr-xr-x 12 root root 4096 2024-01-21 20:53 . -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5767 2022-02-02 22:44 ./ANNOUNCE.15.0 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 16609 2022-03-30 19:03 ./CHANGES_AND_HINTS.TXT --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1211969 2024-01-16 20:52 ./CHECKSUMS.md5 --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2024-01-16 20:52 ./CHECKSUMS.md5.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1211977 2024-01-21 20:53 ./CHECKSUMS.md5 +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2024-01-21 20:53 ./CHECKSUMS.md5.asc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 17976 1994-06-10 02:28 ./COPYING -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 35147 2007-06-30 04:21 ./COPYING3 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19573 2016-06-23 20:08 ./COPYRIGHT.TXT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 616 2006-10-02 04:37 ./CRYPTO_NOTICE.TXT --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2082256 2024-01-17 21:13 ./ChangeLog.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2083010 2024-01-21 20:50 ./ChangeLog.txt drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 2013-03-20 22:17 ./EFI drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2022-02-02 08:21 ./EFI/BOOT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1187840 2021-06-15 19:16 ./EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2022-02-02 08:21 ./EFI/BOOT -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2504 2019-07-05 18:54 ./EFI/BOOT/make-grub.sh -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 10722 2013-09-21 19:02 ./EFI/BOOT/osdetect.cfg -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1273 2013-08-12 21:08 ./EFI/BOOT/tools.cfg --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1586608 2024-01-16 20:52 ./FILELIST.TXT +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1586612 2024-01-21 20:52 ./FILELIST.TXT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1572 2012-08-29 18:27 ./GPG-KEY -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 864745 2022-02-02 08:25 ./PACKAGES.TXT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8034 2022-02-02 03:36 ./README.TXT @@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2022-02-02 08:21 ./EFI/BOOT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 17294 2008-12-08 18:13 ./SPEAK_INSTALL.TXT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 57187 2022-02-01 19:37 ./Slackware-HOWTO -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8700 2022-01-26 05:44 ./UPGRADE.TXT -drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 51532 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra/CHECKSUMS.md5 --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra/CHECKSUMS.md5.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 64691 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra/FILE_LIST --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1981251 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra/MANIFEST.bz2 --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 36565 2023-12-21 20:48 ./extra/PACKAGES.TXT +drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 52595 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra/CHECKSUMS.md5 +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra/CHECKSUMS.md5.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65941 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra/FILE_LIST +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1978845 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra/MANIFEST.bz2 +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 36565 2024-01-21 20:58 ./extra/PACKAGES.TXT -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 149 2002-02-09 00:18 ./extra/README.TXT drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 20480 2020-05-26 20:38 ./extra/aspell-word-lists -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 171 2016-06-06 20:10 ./extra/aspell-word-lists/aspell-af-0.50_0-x86_64-5.txt @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2023-06-06 20:34 ./extra/sendmail -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 586 2023-06-06 19:10 ./extra/sendmail/sendmail-cf-8.17.2-noarch-2_slack15.0.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 118876 2023-06-06 19:10 ./extra/sendmail/sendmail-cf-8.17.2-noarch-2_slack15.0.txz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2023-06-06 19:10 ./extra/sendmail/sendmail-cf-8.17.2-noarch-2_slack15.0.txz.asc -drwxr-xr-x 17 root root 4096 2023-12-21 20:40 ./extra/source +drwxr-xr-x 17 root root 4096 2024-01-21 20:57 ./extra/source lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 2021-04-29 18:18 ./extra/source/alpine -> ../../source/n/alpine drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 2018-11-09 05:59 ./extra/source/aspell-word-lists -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3531 2020-05-26 20:06 ./extra/source/aspell-word-lists/aspell-dict.SlackBuild @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 2021-11-22 19:23 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 405 2019-11-18 19:15 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/force_protocol_3.3_for_UVNCSC.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 299 2021-11-23 19:22 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/tigervnc.pam.d.diff.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 279 2021-11-22 19:23 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/vncserver.xinitrc.diff.gz -drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2023-11-13 18:52 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server +drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2024-01-21 20:19 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 623 2018-07-15 18:32 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-Always-install-vbe-and-int10-sdk-headers.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3846 2018-07-15 18:32 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-autobind-GPUs-to-the-screen.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1175 2022-07-12 17:02 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac.patch.gz @@ -638,6 +638,17 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2023-11-13 18:52 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 792 2023-03-29 18:09 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1127 2023-10-25 18:35 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1534 2023-10-25 18:40 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1150 2023-12-13 20:03 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 972 2023-12-13 20:03 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 998 2024-01-16 19:41 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1388 2024-01-16 19:44 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2299 2024-01-16 19:44 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 781 2024-01-16 19:44 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1160 2024-01-16 19:47 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 981 2024-01-16 19:46 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1351 2024-01-16 19:45 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1124 2024-01-16 19:45 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch.gz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 859 2024-01-16 19:46 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 298 2018-05-30 05:02 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/fix-nouveau-segfault.diff.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 357 2020-09-11 18:38 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/fix-pci-segfault.diff.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 340 2012-04-14 03:01 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/x11.startwithblackscreen.diff.gz @@ -645,7 +656,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2023-11-13 18:52 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1437 2018-05-15 07:55 ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xserver120.patch.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 930 2018-07-26 17:46 ./extra/source/tigervnc/slack-desc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1094249 2021-11-09 07:51 ./extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0.tar.lz --rwxr-xr-- 1 root root 10519 2023-11-13 18:57 ./extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild +-rwxr-xr-- 1 root root 11494 2024-01-21 20:25 ./extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5178288 2021-12-15 19:04 ./extra/source/tigervnc/xorg-server-1.20.14.tar.xz drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2019-09-29 23:48 ./extra/source/xf86-video-fbdev -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 875 2018-02-27 06:13 ./extra/source/xf86-video-fbdev/slack-desc @@ -670,11 +681,11 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2018-04-23 17:20 ./extra/source/xv -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 229 2010-02-19 19:27 ./extra/source/xv/xv.jasper.diff.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 317 2010-02-19 19:15 ./extra/source/xv/xv.prefix.diff.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 282 2010-02-19 19:16 ./extra/source/xv/xv.prefix_x86_64.diff.gz -drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2023-11-13 19:23 ./extra/tigervnc +drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2024-01-21 20:52 ./extra/tigervnc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 2015-12-15 08:03 ./extra/tigervnc/the_fltk_package_must_also_be_installed --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 474 2023-11-13 19:05 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1452740 2023-11-13 19:05 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2023-11-13 19:05 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-4_slack15.0.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 474 2024-01-21 20:28 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1453480 2024-01-21 20:28 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2024-01-21 20:28 ./extra/tigervnc/tigervnc-1.12.0-x86_64-5_slack15.0.txz.asc drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2018-06-01 21:55 ./extra/xf86-video-fbdev -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 411 2018-06-01 05:21 ./extra/xf86-video-fbdev/xf86-video-fbdev-0.5.0-x86_64-1.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 10936 2018-06-01 05:21 ./extra/xf86-video-fbdev/xf86-video-fbdev-0.5.0-x86_64-1.txz @@ -2660,22 +2671,22 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 20480 2022-02-02 04:20 ./slackware64/ap -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-08-02 17:46 ./slackware64/ap/diffutils-3.8-x86_64-1.txz.asc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 349 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmapi-2.2.12-x86_64-5.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 32332 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmapi-2.2.12-x86_64-5.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmapi-2.2.12-x86_64-5.txz.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 472 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 54144 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txz.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 359 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 103636 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txz.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 458 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 368508 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txz.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 602 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 386724 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txz.asc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 558 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txt --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 14191780 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmapi-2.2.12-x86_64-5.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 472 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 54144 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dmidecode-3.3-x86_64-3.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 359 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 103636 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:27 ./slackware64/ap/dvd+rw-tools-7.1-x86_64-5.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 458 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 368508 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/enscript-1.6.6-x86_64-4.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 602 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 386724 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/flac-1.3.3-x86_64-3.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 558 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txt +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 14191780 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-09-27 18:02 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-9.55.0-x86_64-1.txz.asc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 368 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-fonts-std-8.11-noarch-5.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3514504 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-fonts-std-8.11-noarch-5.txz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:28 ./slackware64/ap/ghostscript-fonts-std-8.11-noarch-5.txz.asc @@ -5394,22 +5405,22 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 32768 2022-02-01 04:47 ./slackware64/n -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 484 2021-10-27 17:48 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1285024 2022-01-05 20:04 ./slackware64/n/curl-7.81.0-x86_64-1.txz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2022-01-05 20:04 ./slackware64/n/curl-7.81.0-x86_64-1.txz.asc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 373 2021-02-13 11:58 ./slackware64/n/cyrus-sasl-2.1.27-x86_64-7.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 986628 2021-02-13 11:58 ./slackware64/n/cyrus-sasl-2.1.27-x86_64-7.txz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163 2021-02-13 11:58 ./slackware64/n/cyrus-sasl-2.1.27-x86_64-7.txz.asc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 456 2021-04-18 18:03 ./slackware64/n/daemon-0.8-x86_64-1.txt @@ -8420,17 +8431,17 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2021-08-12 11:27 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/so -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 134196 2004-11-12 12:42 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook-dsssl-doc-1.79.tar.xz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 23929976 2021-07-27 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook-style-xsl-1.79.2-15.fc35.src.rpm -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 163150 2021-07-27 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook-utils-0.6.14-53.fc35.src.rpm --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 98497 2006-10-26 17:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook-xml-4.5.zip --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12412 2018-05-12 19:34 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook2x_0.8.8-17.debian.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 391024 2007-04-11 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook2x_0.8.8.orig.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 133260 2007-04-11 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook_4.5.orig.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 544716 2021-07-27 02:09 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/gnome-doc-utils-0.20.10-26.fc35.src.rpm --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 521481 2021-07-27 02:26 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/gtk-doc-1.33.2-4.fc35.src.rpm --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9984 2016-10-08 13:14 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/libsgmls-perl_1.03ii-36.debian.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 68364 2001-04-15 16:15 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/libsgmls-perl_1.03ii.orig.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 212 2014-05-15 23:52 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/linuxdoc-tools-0.9.20-lib64.patch.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 438044 2020-06-21 14:05 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/linuxdoc-tools_0.9.82.tar.xz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 712 2017-06-07 14:43 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/openjade-1.3.2-gcc46.patch.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 98497 2006-10-26 17:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook-xml-4.5.zip +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12412 2018-05-12 19:34 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook2x_0.8.8-17.debian.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 391024 2007-04-11 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook2x_0.8.8.orig.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 133260 2007-04-11 01:17 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/docbook_4.5.orig.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 544716 2021-07-27 02:09 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/gnome-doc-utils-0.20.10-26.fc35.src.rpm +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 521481 2021-07-27 02:26 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/gtk-doc-1.33.2-4.fc35.src.rpm +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9984 2016-10-08 13:14 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/libsgmls-perl_1.03ii-36.debian.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 68364 2001-04-15 16:15 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/libsgmls-perl_1.03ii.orig.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 212 2014-05-15 23:52 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/linuxdoc-tools-0.9.20-lib64.patch.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 438044 2020-06-21 14:05 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/linuxdoc-tools_0.9.82.tar.xz +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 712 2017-06-07 14:43 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/openjade-1.3.2-gcc46.patch.xz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 643132 2017-06-07 14:49 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/openjade-1.3.2.tar.xz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1528303 2021-07-27 12:02 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/opensp-1.5.2-38.fc35.src.rpm -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 28136 2021-07-27 04:43 ./source/ap/linuxdoc-tools/sources/perl-XML-NamespaceSupport-1.12-15.fc35.src.rpm @@ -14888,24 +14899,24 @@ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2022-01-28 20:47 ./source/x/wayland-protocols drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 317 2018-06-10 05:08 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/64-wqy-zenhei.conf.gz -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 457 2017-04-30 21:32 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/fixup-fontconfig-file.diff.gz --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 2019-09-13 18:30 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/slack-desc --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5743256 2009-04-20 19:06 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei-0.8.38-1.tar.lz --rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 5051 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf.SlackBuild --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 372 2018-03-07 23:23 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei.fix.fontconfig.warning.diff.gz -drwxr-xr-x 11 root root 4096 2021-02-13 05:36 ./source/x/x11 -drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/x11-skel --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 576 2011-03-14 03:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/doinst.sh.gz -drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2007-02-14 19:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/manpages --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1060 2002-05-31 22:23 ./source/x/x11-skel/manpages/xwmconfig.1 -drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2021-01-05 21:04 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 358 2006-08-10 03:33 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/setup.xwmconfig --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 17100 2007-02-12 21:14 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorg.conf-fbdev --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15858 2007-02-12 21:14 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorg.conf-vesa --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12785 2006-08-21 01:53 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorgsetup --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7685 2020-10-30 01:45 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xwmconfig --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 131 2021-01-05 21:04 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xwmconfig.desktop --rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1062 2018-02-27 06:13 ./source/x/x11-skel/slack-desc --rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3122 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/x11-skel.SlackBuild +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1148 2019-09-13 18:30 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/slack-desc +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5743256 2009-04-20 19:06 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei-0.8.38-1.tar.lz +-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 5051 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf.SlackBuild +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 372 2018-03-07 23:23 ./source/x/wqy-zenhei-font-ttf/wqy-zenhei.fix.fontconfig.warning.diff.gz +drwxr-xr-x 11 root root 4096 2021-02-13 05:36 ./source/x/x11 +drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/x11-skel +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 576 2011-03-14 03:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/doinst.sh.gz +drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2007-02-14 19:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/manpages +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1060 2002-05-31 22:23 ./source/x/x11-skel/manpages/xwmconfig.1 +drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 2021-01-05 21:04 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 358 2006-08-10 03:33 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/setup.xwmconfig +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 17100 2007-02-12 21:14 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorg.conf-fbdev +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15858 2007-02-12 21:14 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorg.conf-vesa +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12785 2006-08-21 01:53 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xorgsetup +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7685 2020-10-30 01:45 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xwmconfig +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 131 2021-01-05 21:04 ./source/x/x11-skel/scripts/xwmconfig.desktop +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1062 2018-02-27 06:13 ./source/x/x11-skel/slack-desc +-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3122 2021-02-13 05:32 ./source/x/x11-skel/x11-skel.SlackBuild -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 376 2021-01-16 18:58 ./source/x/x11/arch.use.flags drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 12288 2021-11-29 19:51 ./source/x/x11/build -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2 2021-02-13 05:35 ./source/x/x11/build/anthy diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e2fca615 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons + +button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all +our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating +insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in +XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, +leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. + +CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ + dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + } + + if (from->button->xkb_acts) { +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { +- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) +- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); +- } ++ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, +- sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + } + else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + + if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { + int i; ++ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; ++ + DeviceChangedEvent event = { + .header = ET_Internal, + .type = ET_DeviceChanged, +@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + }; + + master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; ++ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { ++ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], ++ 0, ++ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ } + + memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * + sizeof(Atom)); +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed2044c7d --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcRRChange*Property + +Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. +See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core +protocol and XI. + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- + randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); +diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e928729e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps + +Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for +each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped +to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping. + +CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +-- + dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c ++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client) + if (pDev->button) { + int i; + +- rep.buttons_len = +- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons)); ++ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */ + rep.length += rep.buttons_len; + buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4); + if (!buttons) +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail, + + mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER); + +- /* XI 2 event */ +- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0; ++ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8 ++ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */ ++ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0; + btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen); + len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4; + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b5354ba65 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our DeviceStateNotify + +If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is +zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation. + +This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not +both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume +they're applying to the first event in the sequence. + +A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only +one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on +once per type. So effectively this logic code: + + int count = 1; + if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++; + if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++; + if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true + // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device + + ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent)); + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev); + if (button) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); + if (key) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here + +If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're +off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is +written instead. + +Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate. +Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this +patch fixes only the allocation issue. + +Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one +button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero +buttons, it is very unlikely. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev; ++ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev; + deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; + deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; + +@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + } + } + +- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent)); ++ ev = sev; + FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); + + if (b != NULL) { +@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, + DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab); +- free(sev); + } + + void +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1704fad67 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +From 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation + +The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to +be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing +a number of issues. + +This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to +send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple +32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional +deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple) +deviceValuator events. + +The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence +of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not +protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted. + +Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify +and then append the key state and button state, followed by the +valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators +per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that +troughput. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + + ev->type = DeviceValuator; + ev->deviceid = dev->id; +- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3; ++ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6; + ev->first_valuator = first; + switch (ev->num_valuators) { ++ case 6: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; ++ case 5: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; ++ case 4: ++ ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; + case 3: + ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2]; + case 2: +@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first]; + break; + } +- first += ev->num_valuators; + } + + static void +@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons; + memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4); + } +- else if (k) { ++ if (k) { + ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass); + ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - + k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + } + } + +- ++/** ++ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events. ++ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32 ++ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values. ++ * ++ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out: ++ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above ++ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above ++ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4 ++ * ++ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS, ++ */ + static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { ++ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify ++ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */ ++ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6]; + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; +- deviceStateNotify *ev; +- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; +- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev; + + KeyClassPtr k; + ButtonClassPtr b; +@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) { + nbuttons = b->numButtons; +- if (nbuttons > 32) ++ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; + } + if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) { + nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +- if (nkeys > 32) ++ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; +- if (nbuttons > 0) { +- evcount++; +- } + } + if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) { + nval = v->numAxes; +- +- if (nval > 3) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 6) { +- if (!(k && b)) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 9) +- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3); +- } ++ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then ++ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */ ++ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6; + } + +- ev = sev; +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); +- +- if (b != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nbuttons > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++; +- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; +- bev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], +- DOWN_LENGTH - 4); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev)); ++ ++ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first); ++ ++ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) { ++ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; ++ bev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], ++ DOWN_LENGTH - 4); + } + +- if (k != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nkeys > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++; +- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; +- kev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) { ++ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; ++ kev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); + } + ++ first = 3; ++ nval -= 3; + while (nval > 0) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first); ++ first += 6; ++ nval -= 6; + } + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1624ec161 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number of + buttons + +There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class +from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a +device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid. + +Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we +don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices +with more than this number of buttons anyway. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec)); + if (!to->button) + FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n"); ++ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons; + } + else + classes->button = NULL; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1efab4974 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer + +The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the +access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the +function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource(). + +However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created, +hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled. + +When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that +drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use +the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL +pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are +granted for subject security ID. + +To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the +GLX buffers. + +Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch. + +CVE-2024-0408 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c +index fc26a2e345..1e46d0c723 100644 +--- a/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ + #include "indirect_util.h" + #include "protocol-versions.h" + #include "glxvndabi.h" ++#include "xace.h" + + static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI"; + +@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId, + if (!pPixmap) + return BadAlloc; + ++ err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP, ++ pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess); ++ if (err != Success) { ++ (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap); ++ return err; ++ } ++ + /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a + * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the + * pbuffer is destroyed. */ +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e956fba3 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for cursor + +The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and +the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates. + +The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits +devPrivates in within structure of the cursor. + +Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits +to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes +with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits' +devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the +SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a +crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID. + +CVE-2024-0409 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c | 2 +- + hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c +index f991899c50..3f192d034a 100644 +--- a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c ++++ b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c +@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ miPointerSpriteFuncRec EphyrPointerSpriteFuncs = { + Bool + ephyrCursorInit(ScreenPtr screen) + { +- if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, ++ if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR, + sizeof(ephyrCursorRec))) + return FALSE; + +diff --git a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c +index e3c1aaa50c..bd94b0cfbb 100644 +--- a/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c ++++ b/hw/xwayland/xwayland-cursor.c +@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static miPointerScreenFuncRec xwl_pointer_screen_funcs = { + Bool + xwl_screen_init_cursor(struct xwl_screen *xwl_screen) + { +- if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS, 0)) ++ if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&xwl_cursor_private_key, PRIVATE_CURSOR, 0)) + return FALSE; + + return miPointerInitialize(xwl_screen->screen, +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..949efd7c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing master + devices + +The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up +to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`. + +If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same +ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to +two info structures being written to `info`. + +Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two +times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation. + +To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the +device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event +thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and +optionally slave attached/detached). + +CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +index d2d985848d..72d00451e3 100644 +--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c ++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */ + int rc = Success; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; ++ enum { ++ NO_CHANGE, ++ FLUSH, ++ CHANGED, ++ } changes = NO_CHANGE; + + REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); +@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = add_master(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIRemoveMaster: + { + xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any; +@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = remove_master(client, r, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIDetachSlave: + { + xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = CHANGED; + break; ++ } + case XIAttachSlave: + { + xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; ++ changes = CHANGED; ++ break; + } ++ default: + break; + } + ++ if (changes == FLUSH) { ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags)); ++ changes = NO_CHANGE; ++ } ++ + len -= any->length * 4; + any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4); + } + + unwind: +- +- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ if (changes != NO_CHANGE) ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); + return rc; + } +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e58fe8d78 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion + +The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device +is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked +list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list. + +However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive +call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a +removed device. + +This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of +devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap +overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation. + +Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to +`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the +previous device after the recursion. + +CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index dca98c8d1b..389d28a23c 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + { + DeviceIntPtr *prev, other; + BOOL enabled; ++ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; + + if (!dev->enabled) + return TRUE; + +- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; +- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); +- if (*prev != dev) ++ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (other == dev) { ++ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (!dev_in_devices_list) + return FALSE; + + TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev); +@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + LeaveWindow(dev); + SetFocusOut(dev); + ++ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; ++ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); ++ + *prev = dev->next; + dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices; + inputInfo.off_devices = dev; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de7422442 --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved devices + too + +Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this +to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their +reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed +memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave +device. + +And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during +CloseDownDevices(). + +Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 +--- + dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 389d28a23c..84a6406d13 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; + } + } ++ ++ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) { ++ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL); ++ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; ++ } ++ } + } + else { + for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { +@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void) + dev->master = NULL; + } + ++ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev)) ++ dev->master = NULL; ++ } ++ + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices); + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices); + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild b/extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild index 6df803a4a..bb1f64348 100755 --- a/extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild +++ b/extra/source/tigervnc/tigervnc.SlackBuild @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=tigervnc VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} XORGVER=${XORGVER:-$(echo xorg-server-*.tar.?z | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-4_slack15.0} +BUILD=${BUILD:-5_slack15.0} # Do we build the java applet (needs jdk)? JAVA_APPLET=${JAVA_APPLET:-"OFF"} @@ -115,6 +115,17 @@ tar xvf $CWD/xorg-server-$XORGVER.tar.?z --strip-components=1 -C unix/xserver || zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5367.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + zcat $CWD/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 autoreconf -vif || exit 1 ) || exit 1 diff --git a/recompress.sh b/recompress.sh index 17334d110..1a9b18efc 100755 --- a/recompress.sh +++ b/recompress.sh @@ -22,16 +22,24 @@ gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/tigervnc.pam.d.diff gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/force_protocol_3.3_for_UVNCSC.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46342.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-5380.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21885.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46343.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.02.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6377.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6478.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0408.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.03.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/xorg-server.combo.mouse.keyboard.layout.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3553.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-0494.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.02.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46340.correction.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46344.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-autobind-GPUs-to-the-screen.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-xfree86-use-modesetting-driver-by-default-on-GeForce.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/857.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-21886.01.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0003-6907b6ea2b4ce949cb07271f5b678d5966d9df42.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3551.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-4283.patch @@ -39,9 +47,12 @@ gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-1393.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/fix-nouveau-segfault.diff gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/fix-pci-segfault.diff gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/x11.startwithblackscreen.diff +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0229.01.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2023-6816.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-46341.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0002-dd8caf39e9e15d8f302e54045dd08d8ebf1025dc.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2022-3550.patch +gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/CVE-2024-0409.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/06_use-intel-only-on-pre-gen4.diff gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-Always-install-vbe-and-int10-sdk-headers.patch gzip ./extra/source/tigervnc/patches/xorg-server/0001-f1070c01d616c5f21f939d5ebc533738779451ac.patch |